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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Ever since the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
came to power in 1994 in the wake of a genocide
in which 800,000 people died, its government has
mainly been assessed in relation to the way it has
faced the legacy of the genocide and maintained
stability. Understandably, the Rwandan regime has
been preoccupied with its own security, especially
as thousands of génocidaires reorganised in the
Congo, initially supported by Mobutu Sese Seko,
and then by both Laurent and Joseph Kabila.  And
there is no doubt that the threat posed by the ex-
FAR and Interahamwe rebels in the DRC is
serious, and that little has been done by the
international community to counter it.  However, it
does not always justify the tight domestic political
control still exercised by the RPF dominated
government in Rwanda.
The international community, burdened by its own
feelings of guilt for failing to stop the genocide in
1994 has accepted the RPF’s view that security
imperatives require military dominance and that
genuine political liberalisation will have to wait.
Combined with an assumption that the RPF
represents a "new leadership" determined to invent
a new political model rooted in Rwandan culture,
this has produced an implicit international
consensus which gives the RPF almost unlimited
time to achieve its proclaimed goals.
The RPF regime has consistently asserted its
intention to convert its highly militarised system of
government into a civilian democracy rooted in
ethnic reconciliation, purged of ethnic stereotypes
and hatreds, and equipped with a new constitution.
A time frame for the transition, originally set for
five years, has been extended to nine years, to July
2003. The district elections conducted on 6 March
2001 were seen by both the RPF and the
international community as an important stage in
that transition process.  This report examines in
detail the conduct of those elections and draws
some conclusions about the direction in which
Rwanda’s political reconstruction is proceeding.
Those tentative conclusions will be tested in
further ICG reports on the transition process, to be
published over the next several months.
The RPF and the Rwandan Government of
National Unity (GNU)1 that it controls claim to be
attempting to break from the country’s colonial
and post-colonial political inheritance. Since
November 2000, they have been decentralising
government institutions and power with the
declared aim of destroying the political machinery
that facilitated the genocide. The administrative
organisation of the country is being changed and
newly created districts are becoming the focus of
development efforts.  Resources are to be allocated
to the new districts through collective decision-
making at administrative levels that are closer to
citizens. The objective of this policy is said to be
local empowerment and mobilisation of people to
take the destiny of their communities into their
                                                          
1 Soon after the genocide and the RPF’s military victory,
the new government was set up with the aim of
implementing the program of the October 1993 Arusha
agreement, which foresaw a government of National
Unity.
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own hands. The selected political model is called
"consensual democracy".
There was also a more important goal in holding
the March elections, which was to begin to develop
a new RPF "cadre" in the countryside and to build
the party’s political base ahead of presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2003. Great care was
taken, therefore, in the organisation of the
elections. A RPF-controlled National Electoral
Commission (NEC) supervised the entire process
and delivered superbly organised polls. The
national participation rate was over 90 per cent,
and very few electoral malpractices were registered
by local and international observers.
Yet, these elections were far from satisfactory by
any democratic standards. The NEC abused its
powers to veto unwanted candidates and guarantee
that only supporters of government policies were
selected. Voters could choose between 8,175 NEC-
screened candidates to fill slightly more than 2,700
district counsellor positions. But the five senior
executives of each district, and the mayor of the
capital, Kigali, were chosen by electoral colleges
rather than by popular vote. Eighty per cent of
these electoral colleges were composed of cell and
sector officials who themselves had gained their
positions in rather undemocratic elections in 1999.
And their choices for district positions heavily
favoured the status quo: 81 per cent of those
elected were incumbent heads of communes
(bourgmestres), previously appointed by the
government.
The tight political control exercised over the
district elections is at least partly explained by the
fact that Rwanda remains a country at war. The
Rwandan civil war has been largely exported to
Congo's territory since 1994 but the security threat
is not only external. The Ex-FAR and Interahamwe
militias occasionally recruit inside Rwanda, and
launch attacks across the border. Some segments of
the population still share the “Hutu power”
ideology that exploded seven years ago into the
campaign to exterminate the country’s minority
Tutsi population. One of the screens exercised by
the RPF and government through the NEC was
therefore to ensure that only counsellors and
district executives who endorse the policy of
“national unity and reconciliation” were elected.
But by constricting political freedoms under the
motto of national unity and reconciliation, the RPF
risks eroding the very foundations of its own
policies and dampening hopes for Rwanda’s
recovery. Rwandans have shown, for example by
their acceptance of Community Development
Committees (CDCs), that they are willing to take
over management of their own communities when
given the opportunity, training and resources.  But
the omnipotence of the security services and the
political control applied to basic political freedoms
in the name of national goals have become
counter-productive. They have driven government
opponents outside the country, and risk feeding the
external threat that the government claims to fight
most. In this context "consensual democracy" has
become the imposition of one party’s ideology.
It is time to look to look at governance issues in
Rwanda from a fresh perspective and to
acknowledge that the focus on external security
has restricted reform of internal politics. Of course
the regional security context has to be taken into
account and the international community must do
much more to assist in the Disarmament,
Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation
(DDRR) of the Hutu rebels. It should also exercise
diplomatic pressure to speed up the peace
processes in the DRC and Burundi, both of which
have important implications for Rwanda.
But nine years on, a change of course is necessary
if the transition is to succeed. Without the
acceptance of opposition voices in the internal
debate and the eventual return and reintegration of
the Hutu groups, political life in Rwanda will
remain distorted and unhealthy. The ongoing
writing of the new constitution is a good
opportunity for the regime to show its willingness
to increase political freedom.
International donors, whose aid is vital to resource-
poor Rwanda, can make an important contribution
to Rwanda's political reconstruction. They need to
use diplomatic pressure on Rwanda’s neighbours
to improve its security but also to develop a critical
dialogue with the government on the central issue
of political freedom, and to support Rwandan
efforts with funds and technical assistance to lay
the foundations for a more stable future.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
To Rwanda’s international donors:
1. Pressure the signatories of the Lusaka
agreement to comply with their commitment
to stop supporting and disarm the ex FAR
and Interahamwe and give strong financial
and political support to DDRR processes.
2. Give financial and technical support to help
create an efficient election observation
program capable of monitoring the 2003
national polls.
3. Begin a critical dialogue with the
government of Rwanda on the issue of
political freedoms in the country, setting
clear democratic standards and benchmarks
for the continuation of financial support, and
offer assistance and expertise in reaching
these standards and benchmarks. In
particular, encourage the government of
Rwanda to:
a. Provide genuine autonomy to the new
local government institutions and free
their management from interference by
the military and the security services.
b. Urgently establish a legal framework
to professionalise, define a role for,
control the behaviour of, and make
accountable the community-based
Local Defence Forces.
c. Review and amend the electoral law to
guarantee the independence of the
National Electoral Commission.
d. Publicise in advance all election-
related government activities to allow
monitoring by independent observers.
e. Liberalise political party activities up
to the district levels to facilitate
reconstruction of a genuine opposition.
Allow full national political activity,
including public rallies, at least six
months before the 2003 national
election.
f. Create the office of an independent
ombudsman with powers to offer
advice and recommendations in case
of conflicting interpretations of laws
and procedures between the
government and the citizens.
g. Include safeguards for political
freedoms and clear limits on the role
and influence of the security services
in the future constitution.
Nairobi/Brussels, 9 October 2001
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
For any government that follows the overthrow of
an authoritarian regime, the challenges of
politically liberalising are immense and divisive;
Imagine, then the significant additional obstacles
facing a political transition following genocide.
The Rwandan government, dominated by the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, which came to power in
the wake of a genocide that resulted in the deaths
of 800,000 people, faces just such a test.
Unfortunately, if not surprisingly, its early
electoral efforts have not yet been equal to its own
rhetorical objectives of popular empowerment and
transparency, professed in its original "liberation"
ideology.
Since the genocide, the government’s strategy has
been to develop a political system radically
different from those of the first and second
Republics, led by Grégoire Kayibanda (1964-1973)
and Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994). According
to the RPF ideology, these leaders preached hatred
between ethnic communities and practised the
politics of division. National reconciliation
between the Tutsi and Hutu communities,
decentralisation of government and popular
participation in the affairs of the country, were
identified by the government as the three guiding
principles of its policies2 that the district elections
were to set in train3.
                                                          
2 Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President of the
Republic, “Report on the reflection meetings held in the
On 6 March 2001, Rwanda held the first local
government elections in the history of the country.
The Rwandan population elected 2,765 sector
representatives nationally. One week later, District
based Electoral Colleges selected 106 town and
district mayors, and an additional 424 new town
and district executives. These multiple polls
followed the cell and sector polls of March 1999
and were the most visible implementation so far of
the official democratic decentralisation policy,
which has been promoted since 1998 as one of the
building blocks of Rwanda’s political
reconstruction.
These elections had a further objective, however.
They provided the opportunity for the ruling
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to identify a new
set of local leaders, whom it sought to co-opt in
order to entrench its power in the rural areas, and
guarantee a parliamentary and presidential
majority at the planned national elections in 2003.4
The March 2001 vote was, therefore, an important
test.
                                                                                               
Office of the President of the Republic from May 1998 to
March 1999 (detailed document)”, Kigali, Government
Printers, August 1999, Chapter II, pp. 42-54.
3 The decentralisation policy is not new to Rwanda though.
It had been a central policy of the Habyarimana regime in
the late eighties and early nineties. Yet, it never bore fruits
because of the war and the unwillingness of central
government to share its resources with the decentralised
authorities.
4 ICG interview, RPF cadres Kigali 24 August 2001 and
former RPF cadre, Brussels, 10 July 2001.
“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections
ICG Africa Report N°34, 9 October 2001                                                                                                                              Page 2
However, the objective of consolidating of power,
and the accommodation of conflicting political
interests to maintain tight political control risk
undermining the elections' democratic potential.
The main justification remains the security threat
of the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe. After
obtaining refuge in the Congo in 1994, the rebels
regrouped and reorganised, first under the
patronage of Mobutu, then of Laurent Désiré
Kabila, now of his son Joseph Kabila. They
attracted new recruits under the generic name of
the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALIR). ALIR
has been trained and armed by the Congolese
government and its allies to fight Rwanda.
In addition to external threats, the government of
Rwanda  bears the scars of the genocide, a heavily
traumatised and divided society. The killing of
800,000 people, the flight of another two million to
the Congo and Tanzania (of whom close to one
quarter never returned) and the repatriation of one
million more from all over the world have created
a country of people who feel strangers to one
another, although they speak the same mother
tongue, kinyarwanda. In this environment, political
aspirations tend to be inspired by revenge, fear or
the desire to enjoy the rewards of military success.
The government also has extremely limited
resources with which to carry out its policies, and
is heavily dependent on donor funding.
This mixture of regional insecurity, conflicting
political aspirations and limited resources largely
explains why the RPF feels it must implement its
policy of democratic decentralisation under
maximum control. The objectives are to establish a
competent and politically reliable local
government leadership that will guarantee the flow
of aid; efficiently pursue the government’s
development strategy; provide constant support for
national unity and reconciliation; and last but not
least ensure satisfactory political results for the
RPF in 2003. The electorate’s genuine wishes and
choices are peripheral to this strategy.
It is now becoming increasingly evident that the
focus on external security has had serious political
implications on Rwandan internal politics. The
regime also hoped that a strong RPF leadership and
the war against a common enemy based outside the
country would help reinforce national unity. But
each stage of consolidation of RPF power to deal
with security concerns created tensions and
reinforced dissatisfaction about power and
resource sharing. Accompanied by restrictions of
debate and repression of any type of opposition,
the opaque decision making process in the RPF
movement, led a number of opponents to believe
that political debate could not take place inside the
country and to seek support outside.
This report analyses the March 2001 district
elections as a case study of the actual results
achieved by the government regarding the political
reconstruction of the country.5 It shows that the
RPF is implementing a decentralisation policy in
the name of democratisation, without giving it the
chance to succeed. By restricting political
freedoms to a motto of "national unity and
reconciliation" and co-opting leaders that will keep
the regime in place, the RPF is denying the
Rwandan society ways to express its pluralism. As
a result, it is failing to create the new system of
governance that the country so urgently needs, and
is encouraging opposition to express itself outside
the country, therefore feeding what it claims to
fight most -- external insecurity.
                                                          
5 This report is based on three weeks of ICG field work, by
both Rwandan and foreign researchers, focusing on the
provinces of Gisenyi, Gitarama, Kibungo and Kigali.
While the sample is not  definitive, we have found no
evidence that suggests the trends uncovered by ICG in
these provinces were not reproduced in the rest of the
country.. The communal elections are used as a test case to
put into perspective the general political situation of the
country.
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CONSOLIDATION OF RPF POWER
A. RPF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
TEACHING DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL
UNITY AND IDENTIFYING THE “WISE
MEN”
RPF views on Rwanda’s political reconstruction
are based on its diagnosis of the Habyarimana
regime and of the currents that led to the 1994
genocide. It identifies an overly centralised state
structure and ruthless dictatorship as the two root
causes of the 1994 massacres According to the
RPF, the Rwandan population was disempowered
and obeyed like automatons, blindly accepting the
scapegoating of the Tutsi community and the Hutu
internal opposition. “In some communes, in 1994,
almost the entire population had contributed to the
genocide. The majority were very docile, guided
by “power” leaders or greedy individuals eager to
acquire the belongings of the victims (…)”
explains RPF leader Tito Ruteremara. “The
population now has to learn what it has never
known”6. The genocide, showed how deeply ethnic
hatred had been cultivated by the leaders of the
first and the second Republics, and it demonstrated
the extent to which mentalities have to change in
Rwanda.
Ethnic discrimination was the legitimising tool of
the first two Republics, established after
independence in 1964. Leaders built their regimes
on the ideology that political majority rule equals
ethnic majority rule, implying that democracy
mandated the empowerment of Hutu leaders and
the exclusion of Tutsis from all positions of
government. The first Republic, under the
leadership of Grégoire Kayibanda, claimed to
implement the policies of what is called in Rwanda
“the 1959 social revolution” while pursuing the
systematic exclusion of Tutsis. Democracy became
a smoke screen for the domination of Hutu leaders
from the centre of the country. Regular massacres
and pogroms of Tutsi people throughout the 1960’s
led to the flight of hundreds of thousands to
Uganda, Tanzania, the Congo and, in smaller
                                                          
6 ICG interview, Tito Ruteremara, Kigali, 25 January
2001.
numbers, to western countries. Infighting between
Hutu elites from the centre and from the Northwest
of the country led to the overthrow of Kayibanda
in 1973 by General Juvénal Habyarimana, his
chief-of-staff, originating from the Northwest.
Habyarimana replaced exclusion of the Tutsis with
ethnic quotas in state institutions and schools. The
Second Republic ended with Habyarimana's death,
three months of genocidal killings and the RPF’s
military victory in July 1994 over the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe.
From its earliest days on, the RPF has professed a
determination to establish "true democracy",
defined as political majority rule based on a
genuine program uniting all Rwandans.7 The
original RPF ideology proclaims indeed that its
main objective is the eradication of ethnicity from
public life, which was promoted by colonisers as a
"divide and rule" policy, and then reinforced by
post-colonial rulers to consolidate their
authoritarian regimes.
After the genocide, the Government of National
Unity’s (GNU) program endorsed this as the
guiding principle of its policies. Consensus was
held up as the best procedure to follow for its
adoption and implementation.8 National consensus,
reached after consultation and debate with all
concerned parties, is defined as “the majority’s
good ideas”9. The RPF claims that this process
reflects pluralism, which is defined as “the
combination of many opinions”10. It is intended to
recreate a sense of community and belonging
among Rwandans, proving that they can transcend
their regional, religious or ethnic divisions. It is, in
theory, the embodiment of the "consensual
democracy" that the RPF seeks to implement.
The March 2001 district elections must be seen in
this context. They aimed to create the conditions
for consensual democracy within local
government, just as the government considers it
                                                          
7 ICG interview, RPF Secretary general, Kigali, 15/03/01.
8 Cf. ICG interview, Tito Ruteremara, Kigali, 25 February
2001.
9 Cf. Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President of the
Republic, “Report on the reflection meetings held in the
Office of the President of the Republic from May 1998 to
March 1999 (detailed document)”, Kigali, Government
Printers, August 1999, p. 43.
10 Cf. Misser (F.), « Vers un nouveau Rwanda ? Entretiens
avec Paul Kagame », Bruxelles, Luc Pire/Karthala, 1995,
p. 133.
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has promoted such conditions at national level. As
the former Secretary General of the Ministry for
Local Government, Protais Musoni, argued at a
“sensitisation” seminar in Ruhengeri: “We need
unity and reconciliation. We need to feel
Rwandese, all equally. But it’s only possible when
a community has common ideas, a common
authority, the same government. After the Council
of Ministers is finished, and the decision-making
process is over, every Minister knows that the
decisions taken are not those of a Hutu or a Tutsi.
It will be the same for the decisions taken at the
level of sector committees. And in the end, the
ethnic issue will fade away”.11
Participation of the population in the decision-
making process, genuine representation at local
and national levels, popular control over leaders in
order to strengthen their accountability are the
three pillars of the government and RPF
democratisation policy12.
But the RPF has also set limits to democratisation:
“Elections are one manifestation of democracy,
and because we committed ourselves to teach our
people what it was, we are doing it”13. It is done
only in so far as it does not compromise national
unity and reconciliation. First, elections are not
regarded as democracy by themselves. According
to President Kagame, democracy needs
development and must include “fundamental
dimensions and rights that are indispensable for the
dignity of man”(i.e. among others: security -- the
right to life, the absence of any social
discrimination, the right to equal opportunities, the
right to a fair share of national resources, the right
to freedom of expression of opinion).14 Second,
elections, and especially multi-party elections, are
regarded as tending to promote divisions. This,
according to Paul Kagame, justified the suspension
                                                          
11 Cf. « Les échéances électorales de Mars 2001 », Grands
Lacs Hebdo, 23/01/01. Musoni served as chairman of the
National Electoral Commission during the March 2001
elections.  See below.
12 Cf. Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President of the
Republic, “Report on the reflection meetings held in the
Office of the President of the Republic from May 1998 to
March 1999 (detailed document)”, Kigali, Government
Printers, August 1999, p. 43.
13 Interview ICG, Charles Murigande, Kigali, 2 March
2001.
14 Cf. Statement by H.E. Major General Paul Kagame,
Vice-President and Minister of Defence to the
Development and Cooperation Committee of the European
Parliament, 20 January 1998.
of political party activities in 1995: “at the present
moment, if you tried to organise elections, to
authorise the proliferation of parties like
mushrooms and let them start competing, you
would create problems even bigger than those you
already have: you would divide divided people …
Multi-partyism in African societies, what does it
mean? I use any tactic to distinguish myself from
my neighbour in order to get more votes than him.
In this game, it does not really matter if I lie. In the
current process, if you authorise elections, at this
present time, you will never build that country.
You will never have a united country. We won’t
have democracy: people are going to rush on one
another”15.
Seven years later, political parties are still barred
from local elections. RPF Secretary-General
Charles Murigande explained that “so far, we can’t
evaluate the contribution of political parties to
reconciliation, even when they belong to
institutions which are devoted to reconciliation.
The immaturity of political parties in Africa is
such, that they build their following on ethnic or
religious lines; it convinced us that the population
should be left alone to elect competent leaders”.16
The RPF regime considered the local district
elections a test to gauge whether the population
had abandoned radical views and adopted the new
regime's values:
For the past seven years, we have tried to teach the
Rwandan population new values. Rwandans must
be judged on what they are capable to do, not on
what they are by accident. This country belongs to
all of us and positive values are necessary to
rebuild it. The issue [for the district elections] will
be to see whether the population agrees to this. It
really is the central issue. If the population chooses
people who believe in these values, we will have
succeeded in our mission, even if the candidates
belong to other parties. There is no difference
between these people and the RPF. But if the
people elected are sectarians, it will mean that the
future is still uncertain. If few people of the RPF
are not selected but many with positive values, I
will easily recruit them. These elections are going
to show us to what extent the country has changed.
                                                          
15 Cf. Misser (F.), « Vers un nouveau Rwanda ? Entretiens
avec Paul Kagame », Bruxelles, Luc Pire/Karthala, 1995,
p. 134.
16 ICG interview, Kigali, 2 March 2001.
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(…) If radicals and extremists are elected, we will
be able to say that we are still in danger17.
As these quotations show, the regime does not yet
fully trust the population,. It doubts that voters are
"enlightened" enough to choose the leaders bearing
“positive values”, the wise men and women that it
will then seek to recruit into its ranks. The
decentralisation program was designed in part to
identify these wise men and women and give them
a chance to prove themselves, according to the
RPF criteria.
B. BREAKING THE GENOCIDAL
MACHINERY
The second objective of the March 2001 elections
was to break the administrative machinery that had
facilitated genocide and still inhibits the change in
Rwanda’s political culture.
In May 2000, the government published its
decentralisation blueprint18, which identified three
modes of implementation: 1) a shift of central
government services and functions towards local
government levels; 2) delegation of resources to
local government; and 3) devolution of powers to
local government institutions.19 Implementation
over three phases will eventually result in the
transfer of all provincial responsibilities to the
districts,20 which will become the focus of local
government.  Other levels of administration will
simply  support local and central government
activities.
This decentralisation process, if genuinely
implemented, could change the face of Rwanda’s
administration. Its objective is to bury the prestige
and authority of the former Commune leaders, the
bourgmestres, who bore much of the responsibility
for implementing the genocide, and to set up a new
                                                          
17 Interview ICG, Charles Murigande, Kigali, 2 March
2001.
18 Cf. Republic of Rwanda, Ministry for Local
Government and Social Affairs, National Decentralization
Policy, May 2000; and Republic of Rwanda, Ministry for
Local Government and Social Affairs, Implementation
Strategy for National Decentralisation Policy, May 2000;
Appendix 4: The National decentralisation policy of the
Government of Rwanda (Some abstracts).
19 Cf. Republic of Rwanda, Ministry for Local
Government and Social Affairs, National Decentralization
Policy, op. cit. p. 5.
20 Ibidem, p. 9.
political culture, based on participation, collective
decision-making and accountability of the district
executive to the district council. Under Juvénal
Habyarimana's regime, Rwanda was divided into
prefectures, communes, sectors and cells. Each
division had a head, appointed by the Office of the
President. The commune became a strong unit of
identification for the Rwandan population, and the
bourgmestres had unchallenged authority over
their fellow commune members, whom they
guided and coerced in all aspects of life.
The new framework is intended to break with the
colonial legacy both in form and substance. It
establishes levels of collective consultation for
decision-making from the bottom level of the state
pyramid, while the pyramid itself is substantially
revised, with changes of terminology and
administrative boundaries. The government has
renamed most districts, often reverting to older
names of socio-cultural administrative units, used
and institutionalised by the monarchy and
throughout colonisation21.
The implementation of the administrative reform
took place in December 2000 as the 154 former
communes were transformed into 106 new units,
consisting of 91 districts and fifteen towns.
However, the new indirect system of
representation has been criticised for being both
too complex and open to manipulation22. The
National Electoral Commission (NEC) chairman,
Protais Musoni, admits that it was not very well
received by the population during its sensitisation
campaign23 and that Rwandans complained openly
that they could not elect their district mayor
directly. The RPF considers, however, that direct
elections would defeat the purpose of its policy,
which aims to break down the personalisation of
authority. The government wishes to weaken any
direct link between the population and its district
leaders in favour of a stronger collective
accountability that would increase popular
participation in local government. Of course,
indirect representation is by no means necessarily
undemocratic. Such systems are common at local
and national levels in many democratic societies.
                                                          
21 ICG Interview, Tito Ruteremara, Kigali, 25 January
2001. For a full description of the changes and the new
structures, see Appendix 2 below.
22 Human Rights Watch, “Rwanda Backgrounder”, 31
January 2001.
23 ICG interview, Kigali, 03 February 2001
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In this respect, at least in theory, the Rwandan
system represents an interesting experiment in
building a new type of governance.
C. PREPARING FOR THE 2003 NATIONAL
ELECTIONS AND BEYOND
Rwanda is now preparing for the end of a nine-
year political transition. After the genocide and the
RPF’s military victory, the new government was
set up with the aim of implementing the October
1993 Arusha agreement24. The program included
organisation of national elections, the writing of a
new constitution, and the formation of a national
army.25 The original five-year transition period,–
extended to nine years in 1999 – has next on its
agenda the writing of a new constitution.
But before the deadline expires, the RPF must
evolve from a rebel movement to a genuine
political party. The March 2001 polls were seen,
therefore, a crucial component of the RPF’s
strategy to retain power beyond the end of the
transition. They offered a useful technical rehearsal
for national elections and identified new local
leaders who could strengthen the RPF’s political
links to the countryside.
                                                          
24 The Arusha agreement between the Government of the
Republic of Rwanda and The Rwandan Patriotic Front was
negotiated from July 1992 to October 1993 in order to put
an end to the war started in October 1990 by the RPF.
Reached under the facilitation of the Government of
Tanzania, The agreement consists of five protocols and a
ceasefire agreement dealing with the different bones of
contention which led to the war: 1. The restoration of the
rule of law;  2. Power sharing between the different
Rwandan armed and non-armed political forces; 3.The
repatriation of Rwanda refugees and the resettlement of
internally displaced persons; 4. The integration of both
armies in one army of national unity; 5. The practical steps
to be taken for its implementation. The Agreement never
had the opportunity to be implemented before the RPF
took over Kigali. By April 1994, UN forces had been
deployed in Kigali and one RPA battalion had taken its
agreed position within Parliament premises, but recurrent
killings of Tutsi civilians by Interahamwe militias and
ultimately the beginning of the genocide, right after
Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 7 April
1994, forced the RPF to restart the war. Since October
1994 and the formation of the Government of National
Unity, the Arusha agreements have been considered as part
of the fundamental Laws of the country, even though
many of its provisions are not respected anymore.
25 Cf. “Arusha Peace Accords between the Government of
the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic
Front », mimeo, 1993.
The origin of the democratic decentralisation
policy can be traced to the RPF’s February 1998
Congress at Kicukiro. The main outcome of that
Congress is often seen as the rise of Paul Kagame
to the RPF chairmanship, replacing the Minister
for Interior, Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe. In addition,
President Pasteur Bizimungu was elected vice-
chairman and Charles Murigande, a professor of
mathematics and former rector of the Rwanda
National University in Butare, secretary-general.26
This new team received a strong mandate: to take
the country through the transition period and to
ensure an RPF victory in the eventual national
election.27 Democratic decentralisation was
conceived as a road map for that national electoral
victory, with a number of steps that would allow
the RPF to build and test its capacity to win votes.
The strategy was to be implemented in three steps:
policy formulation, establishment of the necessary
institutional set-up, and construction of reliable
electoral machinery. The policy formulation
process was filtered through the Urugwiro
Saturday meetings, which were convened by
President Bizimungu from the end of May 1998
until February 1999. Every Saturday, the president
invited members of the cabinet, the executive
bureau of the Transitional National Assembly
(TNA), presidents of TNA commissions, leaders of
national organisations (parties, civil society),
prefects, local wise men and sometimes clerics to
consult and achieve consensus on key policy
issues. These meetings were aimed to test major
RPF policy initiatives with the other political
forces of the country.28 The members of the
Saturday sessions therefore agreed that, on an
experimental basis, and with a view to promoting
decentralisation, popular elections would be held
nation-wide.29
                                                          
26 Economist intelligence unit, Rwanda report, 2nd quarter
1998.
27 ICG Interview, former RPF official, Brussels, 12 June
2001
28 Looking at the conclusions of the Urugwiro sessions
report, the Saturday meetings did not seem to leave much
room to accommodate contrasting views though. Cf. The
unfortunate experience of the MDR leadership at the end
of May 1998 is recalled in Reyntjens (F.), “Evolution
politique au Rwanda et au Burundi, 1998-1999”, in
Marysse (S.), Reyntjens (F.), sld., Annuaire de l’Afrique
des Grands Lacs 1998-1999, Anvers-Paris, CEGL-
L’Harmattan, 1999, pp. 127-128.
29 Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President of the
Republic, “Report on the reflection meetings held in the
Office of the President of the Republic from May 1998 to
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The RPF began to build its electoral machine
immediately after the February 1998 Congress.
First, its corps of cadres was revived for “Politics
and Mass Mobilisation” (PMM). Cadres form the
active political arm of the RPF.  They were first
set-up during the war to mobilise, recruit and
spread the RPF philosophy in both “occupied” and
“freed” territory inside Rwanda, and among the
Rwandan diaspora. From July 1994 onwards,
cadres were in charge of the distribution of houses
and the general political surveillance of foreign
and national institutions. Cadres were posted at all
levels of the administration, both in Kigali and the
provinces, to control the actions of civil servants,
ministers and politicians. They applied to work in
UN agencies, local and foreign NGOs and key
businesses to monitor attitudes towards the
government and general activities. They were also
in charge of information and responsible for
running the RPF-related institutions (RPF
secretariat, Rwanda Development Organisation,
the Tristar group of companies, Rwanda News
Agency, Office Rwandais d'Information, etc.).30
In July 1998, the RPF secretary-general organised
a meeting in Kicukiro and gave the cadres a new
mission: electoral victory. RPF cells were to be
created in every administrative cell throughout the
country with the duty of selecting three to five
candidates for the March 1999 local elections.
Cadres were also involved in the set-up of Local
Defence Forces (LDF)31, with the support of the
army. Officers, who themselves had been trained
for PMM, often gave the cadres logistical
support.32
In parallel, the February 1998 Kicukiro Congress
put Aloysia Inyumba, the minister for Women and
Social Services, in charge of building up a national
RPF network of women’s groups (Inzego Z'abari
n'abategarugori), using funds for women’s
empowerment allocated to her ministry. By the
                                                                                               
March 1999 (detailed document)”, op. cit., Chapter II, pp.
42-54.
30 Interview ICG, former RPF member, Brussels, 9 July
2001.
31 LDF are a community based security service, which is
supposed to mobilise and protect the population against
infiltrators. It has nevertheless come under heavy criticism
from Human Rights organisation for its abuses and lack of
accountability. Cf. among others, Human Rights Watch,
“Rwanda: the search for security and Human Rights
abuses”, New York, April 2000, Vol. 12, N°1(A).
32 Interview ICG, former RPF member, Brussels, 9 July
2001.
first quarter of 1999, Catholic youth leaders were
recruited with the help of the newly created
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
(NURC) to mobilise the youth constituency. Youth
groups were taken to Ingando (solidarity camps)
for ideological training sessions and urged to elect
pro-RPF leaders who, like the leaders of the
women’s groups, were promised positions within
the future district councils or even seats in
parliament if they supported the RPF.33 Similarly,
cell and sector leaders were taken to NURC
solidarity camps to study civic education and RPF
ideology. The NURC solidarity camps became the
training grounds for RPF political sensitisation,
education and for the selection of electoral
candidates.34
What was therefore partly at stake in the March
2001 district elections was RPF political capacity
to win a parliamentary and presidential majority in
2003.35 The close link between administrative
reform and political process is also apparent from
the redrawing of administrative boundaries. The
official purpose of the redrawing was to make the
districts economically viable. Decentralisation to
undersized administrative units, without a real tax
base, would indeed be counter-productive and
unsustainable. The number of communes was,
therefore, reduced from 154 to 106. But the new
districts were also unofficially designed to become
parliamentary constituencies.36 As confirmation,
the national decentralisation policy states openly
that the future member of parliament from a
district will have the right to attend council
meetings and follow the council’s proceedings.
                                                          
33 ICG interview, former RPF official, Brussels, 12 June
2001 and youth district candidate, Kigali, 2 March 2001.
34 ICG interview, Kigali, NURC official, 31 January 2001.
35 For some insights see Shyaka Kanuma, “The secrets of
the October poll”, Rwanda Newsline, Vol. 11, N°32,
August 21-27 2000.
36 ICG interview, western diplomat, Kigali, 9 March 2001
and Rwanda Herald, 8 January 2001.
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III. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL
CONSTRAINTS
From the time it was launched, the RPF political
strategy described above has been overshadowed
by the security agenda. In February 1998, the
month of the Mulindi Congress, ex-FAR and
Interahamwe started re-infiltrating Rwanda from
the Congo, jeopardising the RPF’s military
achievements in the first Congo war. In that first
struggle in the Congo, Rwanda, allied with
Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa and
Burundi, had brought Laurent Désiré Kabila to
power in Kinshasa, and destroyed the Hutu
rebellion's rear bases, significantly reducing the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe threat. By January 1997, most
Rwandan refugees had returned from Tanzania.
Pockets of roaming fighters who had managed to
escape the screening for returning refugees were
finally neutralised by the end of that year.37 But by
the beginning of 1998, Rwanda was under threat
again. Relations with Kabila deteriorated
dramatically, and by August, the second Congo
war broke out.
A. THE REGIONAL INSECURITY TRAP
Security has remained the first priority of the
Rwandan government since 1994. The government
believes that, without security for Rwandan
citizens, reconciliation and reconstruction policies
are meaningless. After the beginning of the second
Congo war, by early 1999, Rwanda’s territory was
again secure enough for cell and sector elections to
be organised in March of that year. Security has
been restored by military campaigns,
counterinsurgency tactics involving the
mobilisation of Hutu political leaders, the
participation of local communities in the fight
against the insurgents and the recruitment and
deployment of ex-FAR soldiers within the RPA
units of the Northwest.38
But the control of Rwanda’s territory by the RPA
did not mean that the security threat had
disappeared. First, the ideology of hating and
                                                          
37 Cf. Economist Intelligence Unit, Rwanda reports, 1st to
4th quarters 1997 and 1998.
38 Cf. Prendergast (J.), Smock (D), “Post-genocidal
reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi”,
USIP special report, 15 September 1999,
www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990915/sr990915.html
killing the Tutsi propagated by surviving Hutu
power leaders remains strong in the Northwest of
the country and has contaminated neighbouring
communities across the Congo border in the
Kivus.39 The new recruits who have joined ALIR
since 1996 have been indoctrinated into the same
ideology of Hutu power.40 Therefore, despite the
RPA’s overwhelming military superiority over the
ALIR, the ideology of Tutsi extermination has not
been eradicated and remains a genuine security
issue in the entire region. Moreover, the civil war
in Burundi, where the ALIR is associated with the
Burundian Hutu rebellion, is of genuine concern to
Rwanda. The Rwandan government cannot afford
to have a hostile ALIR base on its southern border
while the war continues in the Kivus. The recently
declared hostility of Uganda, after three battles
against the RPA for control of the key Congo city
of Kisangani, also increases the pressure on
Rwanda’s government. It is highly unlikely that
Uganda will wage war on Rwanda, but Kampala
has become a safe heaven for the RPF’s political
opponents. Further, there are clear signs that
Uganda is in close contact with the political
opposition to the Rwandan regime based both
inside the country and abroad.
Rwanda, therefore, remains above all a country at
war and behaves as such. The government suspects
that infiltration is also sometimes supported by the
population.41 Accordingly, the regime relies on an
oversized army and powerful security services,42
                                                          
39 The continued presence of Rwanda in the Congo is
obviously more complex than the sole handling of a
security threat as argued by the RPF. For background on
Rwanda's strategy in DRC, see ICG, “Scramble for the
Congo. Anatomy of an Ugly War”, Central Africa Report
N° 12, 20 December 2000.
40 ICG interview, Rwanda expert, Brussels, 17 July 2001.
41 There are mixed signals sent by the Rwanda population
in this respect. In the case of the most recent May and June
infiltrations, Rwandans in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi were
instrumental in stopping the ALIR quickly and
successfully. People informed the RPA of the infiltrator’s
presence within their home areas. On the other hand, many
young fighters killed and captured by the RPA were
actually new ALIR recruits coming from Ruhengeri and
Gisenyi. This situation suggests that the adult generation
of Rwandans is tired of the war and does not think ALIR
can bring a better future for Rwanda, but a number of Hutu
youngsters remain attracted by the ALIR. ICG interview,
Rwandan security official, Arusha, 23 July 2001.
42 On social and political trends within the RPF since 1994
see Michael Dorsey, “Violence and Power-building in
Post-Genocide Rwanda”, in Doom (R.), Gorus (J.), eds.,
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which are regularly criticised by human rights
organisations for their abuses.43 The Directorate of
Military Intelligence (DMI), the overall umbrella
for all security services, organises tight
surveillance for possible connections between
internal opposition and external threats and
systematically represses opponents. It has
succeeded in infusing the idea of its omnipresence,
triggering self-censorship. In this context, it is
highly likely that the daily search for consensus in
the name of national unity and reconciliation is not
genuine and often succeeds only through fear.
B. INTERNAL POLITICAL TENSIONS
The current RPF strategy does not necessarily
enjoy unanimous support among the Tutsi
population. At the upper level of government, the
rebuilding of a strong RPF political apparatus
necessarily implies a reduction of military
influence on state decision-making and resource
allocation. At a lower level, Tutsi returnees, rightly
or wrongly, implicitly believed that the post
genocide and post victory power sharing deal
would include a bargain between the various Tutsi
groups in Rwanda. Anglophone returnees from
Uganda, controlling the upper tier of government
and more specifically the army, would remain
unchallenged in Kigali, while francophone Tutsi
returnees from Burundi, Tanzania and the Congo
would dominate the provinces and lesser offices at
the national level. The grooming of a new
generation of Hutu leaders to take local
government positions undermines this unwritten
political agreement at the expense of the
francophone Tutsis, hence causing their
dissatisfaction, and of the survivors of the
genocide, who want justice a pre condition of any
political reform44.
In Kigali, a genocide survivor described the district
elections as “the return of the killers”.45 According
to him, the RPF is preparing a new generation of
Hutu political leaders through the establishment of
local authorities, in order to bury the hatchet with
                                                                                               
Politics of identity and Economics of conflict in the Great
Lakes Region, Brussels, V.U.B., 2000.
43 Cf. among other reports: Human Rights Watch,
“Rwanda: the search for security and Human Rights
abuses”, New York, April 2000, Vol. 12, N°1(A).
44 ICG interviews, Burundi and Congo returnees, Kigali,
February-March 2001.
45 ICG interview, Kigali, 6 March 2001.
the Hutu masses ahead of national elections. The
gacaca judicial system, which for the genocide
survivors will free most Hutu prisoners within two
years, is part of the same strategy and is seen by
many as a betrayal. Moreover, some returnees do
not understand why power and resources have to
be shared with the Hutus. Their ideal political
system would be closer to the restoration of a strict
Tutsi dictatorship, similar to Burundi in the 1970’s
and 1980’s, and for some, a monarchy. For them,
either all Hutus carry collective responsibility for
the genocide and have to pay for it, no matter what,
or power sharing is seen as a foreign imposed
concept that is unfair because it is now their time
to rule and benefit from state resources.
The entire reconciliation policy is based on the
gamble that a new Hutu leadership can and will
rise from the ashes of the former parties and of the
post-genocide repression, that new Hutu leaders
will adhere to RPF ideology while being “trained”
and “enlightened” in the "ingando", (solidarity
camps), and that they will serve the RPF faithfully.
It also assumes that they will understand the abuse
of violence unleashed on suspected infiltrators and
their accomplices since 1995, and that they will
understand and support the demotion of most
senior Hutu leaders since then (Faustin
Twagiramungu, Seth Sendashonga, Pierre-Célestin
Rwigyema, Pasteur Bizimungu, Théobald Gakaya
Rwaka, etc.).46 There are no such guarantees in
politics, however and social perceptions can't be
reformed through a top down process.
C. THE CHALLENGE OF LIMITED
RESOURCES
The Government of National Unity is also under
pressure to fulfil its own promises to the
international community. The ambitious
democratic decentralisation policy is based on the
assumption that Rwandans are ready to participate
fully in the management of their own affairs. It
demands that people spend their own time and
effort without remuneration, to contribute to the
numerous meetings that the running of cell and
sector committees necessitates. In this respect, the
decentralisation policy risks suffering from the
same problems that Uganda has experienced with
its local government experiments: massive
absenteeism and sometimes incompetence, which
                                                          
46 Cf. the chronology in Appendix 1.
“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections
ICG Africa Report N°34, 9 October 2001                                                                                                                            Page 10
leaves the actual decision-making process in the
hands of committee chairmen and secretaries.47
Implementation of the decentralisation policy,
which has already started at sector level, shows
that the collective community involvement works
as long as there is adequate financial support,
which in practice means adequate foreign financial
support. Development aid policies focused at
provincial levels, inviting donors to concentrate
their funding on complementary projects within the
same area (ideally, at least one donor for each
province), have already produced satisfactory
results. The sector level Community Development
Committees (CDC's), in particular, are considered
by many aid agencies as a success48. The CDC's
have shown that Rwandans can take over
management of their own communities when given
the opportunity, training and resources. However,
when no donor is available to finance development
and infrastructure projects and promote capacity-
building, the whole set-up becomes dormant, and
the consultative committees hardly meet.49 This
raises the crucial issue of the sustainability of the
decentralisation effort in a country where resources
are dramatically limited and too heavily consumed
by security activities. Decentralisation can only
work if there is a constant flow of financial
resources to local government.
The tax base available to local authorities will
remain extremely limited for the foreseeable
future, even assuming that Kigali allows many
resources to be transferred -- a policy which has
already met resistance in some key ministries.50
External financial support will therefore be key to
the success or failure of the decentralisation
strategy. Many expectations have already been
created. There could be a serious political backlash
if financial flows are not forthcoming.
                                                          
47 ICG interview, Foreign local government technical
advisor, Kigali, 11 March 2001.
48 ICG interview, several Foreign Aid agency
representatives, Kigali, 18 January 2001, 24 January 2001,
9 March 2001; Western diplomat, Kigali, 23 January 2001.
49 Ibid.
50 ICG interview, several Foreign Aid agency
representatives, Kigali, 18 January 2001, 24 January 2001,
9 March 2001; Western diplomat, Kigali, 23 January 2001.




The March 2001 District elections were
undoubtedly an administrative success. The
National Election Commission (NEC) proved that
it could successfully conduct a poll on behalf of
both the people of Rwanda and the Office of the
President. But this so perfect orchestration of the
event made some observers and voters suspect that
the results were not a genuine reflection of the
Rwandan people’s will.
The elections were described by the regime’s
exiled opponents and even by some diplomats as a
farce, controlled and manipulated by the RPF.51
Local and international human rights organisations
denounced the complexities of the electoral
system, the impossibility for political parties to
campaign, and the heavy control the RPF-
dominated NEC exercised over the selection of
candidates.52
The elections, however, were not a farce. The
secret ballot was largely respected, and malpractice
was minimal. The population was given the
opportunity to elect district counsellors, albeit
those cleared by the NEC, through a secret ballot.
But they had to accept their mayors and other
district executives chosen by an electoral college
composed mostly of the cell heads and sector
executives elected in 1999. As the RPF secretary-
general explained, the Rwandan electorate was
tested with a very limited mandate under tight
political control. The RPF took no chances but left
some room for new “wise men” to be selected.
This is a step for democratisation, as President
Kagame himself argued53, but a very small one
indeed.
                                                          
51 Cf. Organisation for Peace, Justice and Development in
Rwanda, “OPJDR rejects March 2001 Rwandan local
elections”, 15 March, 2001 and ICG interview, western
diplomat, Nairobi, 20 March 2001.
52 Cf. Human Rights Watch, « No Contest in Rwandan
Elections. Many Local Officials Run Unopposed », New
York, 9 March 2001 ; LIPRODHOR, “Rapport sur les
préparatifs des élections au niveau des communes prévus
en date du 6 mars 2001”, Gisenyi, 29 janvier 2001.
53 Cf. Government of Rwanda, “Communal Elections a
significant step in Rwanda’s democratisation-President
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A. THE 1999 PRECEDENT
The first step of the national decentralisation
policy, the cell and sector elections held in March
1999, was a preview of this year's event. Through
these first elections, 80 per cent of the current
Electoral College was identified, which choose the
new district mayors in 2001. The March 1999
elections were subjected to open political control
through use of the queuing system54 that first
became notorious when it allowed rigging of the
1988 general elections in Kenya. The system
originated, however, in colonial times (1920’s)
when chiefs and administrators told their African
subjects to line up behind the ”right” candidates.
Queuing denies freedom of choice and any
subsequent appeal since no material proof of the
vote remains. The only advantage is that it is
cheap, the main reason for its use in Rwanda in
1999.55
There are few detailed accounts of the 1999
elections.56 Reports from international observers
appear strangely blind to the political manipulation
inherent to the queuing system despite harsh
criticism by human rights activists. Officially, of
course, the elections were called a huge success
with over 90 per cent participation and impeccable
management.  International observers found no
problem with RPF-nominated bourgmestres and
their assistants acting as the key organisers of the
polls in the countryside, or with the presence of up
to ten soldiers posted on average at each polling
station in Kigali-Rural, Butare, Gisenyi, Kibungo
and Cyangugu. Under surveillance of the
administrative authorities and/or the army,
candidates were supposed to announce their
running in the elections spontaneously at each
polling station and give a brief speech introducing
one another.
The human rights league LIPRODHOR’s account
on the voting process in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri
                                                                                               
Kagame”, www.rwanda1.com/government/, 7 March
2001.
54 With the queuing system, voters line up behind the
candidate of their choice.
55 ICG interview, NEC executive secretary, 18 January
2001.
56 Cf. UNDP, “Summary of the observation of the local
elections”, mimeo, 5 April 1999; LIPRODHOR,
“Observation des elections locales, régions du Nord-ouest
du Rwanda”, mimeo, 6 April 1999; Economist Intelligence
Unit, Rwanda report, 2nd quarter 1999.
gives a realistic picture of what actually happened.
In Karago commune of Gisenyi, for instance, the
army was deployed by 8:00 a.m. to push people to
the polling stations. In some sectors, the number of
voters was larger than the registered adult
population.  Sick people and teenagers would not
risk being accused by RPA patrols of not
exercising their “constitutional right”. Voting was
effectively compulsory, and 50 people were
arrested in Umutara for not participating.
Government officials acknowledged that those
who did not turn up for voting were asked why and
had to provide good reasons, such as illness.57
Electoral committees often picked the candidates,
who then were given an opportunity to state their
names, level of education and age. The electorate,
however, was strictly forbidden to make any loud
comment or even talk to one another about the
candidates. When the signal was given, electors
were told to line up behind the “candidate of their
choice”58.
The electoral committees consisted of equal
numbers of military personnel and civilian
administrators. Other members of the military in
civilian clothes also checked on the movements of
the population on voting day. Under the
supervision of the prefects and their deputies, the
bourgmestres organised voting operations in each
commune. According to LIPRODHOR, 70 per cent
of incumbent counsellors were re-elected in
Gisenyi and Ruhengeri (the actual figures are 54.2
percent and 59.4 percent), provoking mixed
reactions from the population. Some complained
that the exercise was a facade to legitimise
illegitimate leaders, while others were genuinely
happy and threw the winners into the air while
singing their praises. In Karago Commune, one
reluctant candidate who had refused the honour of
being chosen by the electoral committee, was
jailed for two days. Interestingly, LIPRODHOR
concluded that the population tended to choose the
most highly educated candidates, even if in some
instances communal authorities complained that
these were people sympathetic to armed groups
(i.e. Hutu rebels).”59 Prior to the elections, there
were reports that the RPF establishment was
nervous about the possible election of “bad Hutu
                                                          
57 Economist Intelligence Unit, Rwanda Report, 2nd quarter
1999.
58 LIPRODHOR, “Observation”, op. cit.
59 Ibid.
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leaders”60. But, the impeccable organisation of the
polls did not allow this to happen.
B. THE NATIONAL ELECTORAL
COMMISSION: POLITICAL CONTROL AT
ITS BEST
The 1993 Arusha agreement stipulated that an
independent electoral commission had to guarantee
the organisation of free and fair elections in
Rwanda after a transition period. This commission
was indeed set up by the RPF government to
supervise the district elections. However, in two of
the main areas of the commission’s responsibility –
selection of commissioners and of candidates – its
neutrality, transparency and independence was
doubtful. At the national level, the permanent
secretariat, directly nominated by the Council of
Ministers, was extremely powerful. At the
provincial level, the bourgmestres participated in
selection of commissioners, which meant that they,
as future candidates, helped pick their own judges.
NEC control over candidacies and close links with
the provincial administration made it extremely
difficult for non-RPF supporters to become district
council executives, let alone, district mayors. This
probably explains why there were many single,
unopposed candidacies throughout the country (28
per cent for general candidates)61. The patronising
way in which the RPF controlled the elections
resulted in a significant number of rural elites,
Hutu and Tutsi alike, deciding not to apply to be
candidates, and in effect ignoring local government
structures.
1. Composition Of The NEC
The electoral commission that conducted the
elections was composed of a permanent secretariat
nominated by the executive and of a college of
commissioners elected by Parliament only for the
March vote. Both the president of the commission,
Protais Musoni, and the executive secretary,
Christophe Bazivamo, are powerful RPF
politicians. Musoni, a secretary-general of the RPF
                                                          
60 ICG interview, western diplomat, Kigali, 9 March 2001.
61 There were three types of seats and therefore three types
of candidates for the elections. The general candidates
qualify for the “general seats” and can be men or women,
old or young, whereas there are specific seats reserved for
the representation of traditionally disempowered
majorities, such as the youth and women.
in the early 1990’s,62 was a prefect for Kibungo,
Kigali and was also the former secretary-general of
the Ministry for Local Government. Bazivamo is a
former prefect of Gitarama.63
Each political party presented twelve candidates to
parliament for election to the college of
commissioners. Six were chosen to form the
decision-making caucus of the commission. These
were in office for 60 days before the start of the
elections and 30 days thereafter. The opposition
party Mouvement Démocratique Républicain
(MDR) was absent. It claims that it was not given
the opportunity to make timely
nominations.64However, political interests within
the college were officially “balanced” between the
RPF, the Parti Démocratique Islamique (PDI), the
Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) and the Parti
Libéral (PL). This balance was supposed to
guarantee the objectivity of the commission. All
decisions reached by the commission were
supposedly taken either by consensus or by two-
thirds of the commissioners elected. However,
“mutual understanding” between all members of
the commission insured that almost all decisions
were made by consensus65.
In place since August 2000, the executive secretary
and his team began supervising the elections four
months before the electoral commissioners were
appointed by parliament. In areas where the
decisions and authority of the commission held
most sway, namely the appointment of district and
provincial commissioners and acceptance of
candidacies, the permanent secretariat’s role was
decisive.
Christophe Bazivamo was nominated executive
secretary of the NEC by the Council of Ministers
on 20 June 2000, five months before the NEC was
officially and legally established66. The permanent
secretariat of the commission supervised the
elections from the very beginning, under the
authority of the permanent secretary of the
                                                          
62 Cf. Dorsey (M.), “Violence and Power-building in Post-
Genocide Rwanda”, op. cit.
63 ICG interview, Rwanda political analyst, Kigali, 31
January 2001.
64 ICG interview, MDR Interim President, Kigali, 8 March
2001.
65 ICG Interview with college commissioner, Kigali, 14
March 2001.
66 The six members of the commission were nominated on
14 December 2000.
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Ministry for Local government, future NEC
chairman Protais Musoni. Upon consulting with
the Council of Ministers, the executive secretary
nominated five assistants at the beginning of
August. Once formed, the permanent secretariat
supervised and selected commissioners at the
provincial and district levels and started public
awareness campaigns three months before the legal
basis for the commission was approved. By the end
of August, the secretariat had chosen four
commissioners for each of Rwanda’s 12 provinces,
four months before the college of commissioners
would officially approve them. Meanwhile, the
secretariat appointed and trained members of the
commission at the provincial and district levels and
subsequently checked whether their activities were
satisfactory before presenting their names to the
college for approval at the end of December. In
effect, the decision on whether or not to confirm
provincial and district commissioners was made
entirely by the RPF dominated permanent
secretariat.
The selection of provincial and district
commissioners was a key element of the elections.
33561 commissioners and representatives of the
commission were dispatched throughout the
country from the cell level to the commission
headquarters in Kigali67. Commissioners were
required to be “persons of integrity, upright
citizens sufficiently well considered and accepted
in society that their opinion is valued throughout
the province or district”68. In order to find potential
candidates for the local commissions, the
permanent secretariat relied on prefects to find
suitable candidates for the provincial commission.
Similarly, the newly formed provincial
commissions relied on the district authorities, the
burgomaster and his team, to propose a list of
candidates for the district commission. The ties
between the administration and the commission at
the grassroots level were in some cases very tight.
In the north-western province of Gisenyi, there was
no test for the recruitment of members of the
commission, only the word of the local authorities.
In many cases, the local burgomaster actively
searched the district for someone suitable for the
post. Théoneste Marijoje discovered that he had
been picked to be part of the Gasiza district
electoral commission during what he thought was a
                                                          
67 Source: National Electoral Commission.
68 ICG interview, 14 March 2001.
local administration meeting69. The prefect of
Gisenyi invited a selection of influential people
from the various districts of the province based on
a list established by the local administration and
bourgmestres. These were then informed, without
choice, that they were to be members of their
districts’ electoral commission. Members of the
provincial electoral commission were present but
did not make the final decision70.
Local electoral commissioners wielded significant
power in so far as they were the first authorities to
accept or reject candidates in their district. When,
as in most districts, the outgoing bourgmestre
chose to run for district mayor, he effectively
picked the judge who was going to supervise his
efforts at being re-elected.  Moreover, results of
local investigation indicate a strong possibility that
in most districts of the province of Gisenyi at least
one member per commission was part of the
Directorate of Military Intelligence71. In that
province, both the president of the provincial
commission and the presidents of the commission
of Gasiza and Cyanzarwe districts were confirmed
to be part of the DMI. In Gisenyi town, the
assistant to the outgoing bourgmestre became
president of the electoral commission, further
underlining the links between local administration
and the commission. In Gitarama (Buringa,
Ntongwe, Taba, Musambira, Nyamabuye districts)
and Kibungo (Kabarondo, Rusumo districts)
provinces, local members of the commission were
also chosen by the local authorities72. In these
cases commissioners could no longer be seen as
objective and impartial, but liable to favour
candidates backed by local or governmental
political interests. In Gisenyi’s Kanama district, the
commission backed the candidature of one of the
ex-bourgmestres of the commune, Ignace
Uwamungu. The commission subsequently
contacted friends of the outgoing burgomaster,
Augustin Mfitimana, urging them to dissuade him
from running in the elections.73 Since the
government nominated all prefects and
bourgmestres as well as the permanent secretariat
of the commission, commissioners were invariably
in line with the interests of the RPF dominated
government.
                                                          
69 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 2001.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 ICG observation reports, Gitarama and Kibungo, March
2001.
73 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 2001.
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2. A Too Powerful Institution
The law gave the NEC an essentially technical
role. It instructs the commission to prepare,
supervise and conduct the elections. In practice,
however, the commission ruled on which
candidacies to accept and which to reject while
supervising all electoral campaigns. District
electoral commissions were the first to perform
these tasks. Candidates were required by law to be
highly educated and “persons of integrity”, an
elusive criteria that the NEC alone could assess74.
In fact, the law established guidelines that the
commission was supposed to implement.  The
commission was also to fill jurisdictional gaps and
complement the law via “instructions of the
president of the commission”.  In its interpretation
of the law on candidacies, the commission was the
sole institution deciding whether or not to accept
potential candidacies. The appeal to the Supreme
Court provided by the law was interpreted by the
NEC as only relating to cases of ballot
manipulation, not to its own judgements. No
authority existed to check the potential abuse of
NEC power in the district except the will of an
individual to lodge a challenge. In practice, this
meant appealing to the district level, then
provincial, then to the NEC and, if the plaintiff was
still dissatisfied, as a last resort, to the Supreme
Court. Given the determination needed for an
individual to pursue this process, and its sheer
length, successful complaints against the NEC
were extremely rare .
3. Voter Registration
The NEC’s first achievement was almost universal
voter registration.  In Kigali, the region with the
highest figures the NEC asserted that more than
126 per cent of voters registered! An inaccurate
population census used as the basis of the
calculations explains that unrealistic figure.
Nevertheless quasi-obligation to register produced
a national registration rate of 98.36 per cent.75
These figures do not necessarily demonstrate
enthusiasm. Popular belief was that, just as in
1999, registration and voting were mandatory, and
that the military would expect citizens to carry
                                                          
74 Art 10, Chap 3, N42/2000 of 15 December 2000, Law
instituting the organisation of elections of leaders at the
grass-roots level in Rwanda
75 See Appendix 5 for detailed regional statistics of
registration levels.
their voters’ cards at all times. The law
ambiguously mentioned that registration on the
electoral list was “an obligation for all Rwandans
wishing to vote”.76 The first three days of the
registration period were devoted to “intensive
mobilisation”. From 5 January to 8 January 2001,
registration officers were sent to all cells of the
country, accompanied by members of the Local
Defence Forces, to take people’s details. Only then
did citizens have the opportunity to register
voluntarily in the commission’s offices at district
level. To be registered, potential voters had to be
eighteen years old and hold a national identity
card. Foreigners could also vote provided that they
had resided in the country for at least a year.
C. THE RACE BEFORE THE RACE
The electoral law favoured either educated
individuals or experienced administrators. To be
elected a counsellor at the district level, a
candidate had to hold at least a secondary school
certificate or diploma. But candidates willing to be
elected administrator (mayor, or holder of one of
the other district executive positions) had either to
be university graduates, have completed secondary
education with at least ten years of work
experience, or have completed six years of
secondary education and have been burgomaster
for at least five years78. Such conditions were
impossible for many would-be district mayors to
satisfy. In particular, they disadvantaged many
rural leaders.
Outgoing bourgmestres who were too unpopular or
politically doubtful were frequently removed from
their positions ahead of the elections. In total, 59
bourgmestres – more than one-third of the entire
corps – were replaced by decree before the
elections (26 in 1999, 33 in 2000).79  These were
officials who either were accused by the
                                                          
76 Art 14, Chap 4, N42/2000 of 15 December 2000, Law
instituting the organisation of elections of leaders at the
grass-roots level in Rwanda
77 Cf. LIPRODHOR, “Rapport sur les préparatifs des
élections au niveau des communes prévus en date du 6
mars 2001”, Gisenyi, 29 janvier 2001.
78 Art.11 and 12 Chap.3, N42/2000 of 15 December 2000,
Law instituting the organisation of elections of leaders at
the grass-roots level in Rwanda
79 Annexe to the decree from the Prime Minister’s office
legalising the replacement of the bourgmestres, mimeo,
October 2000.
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population of corruption80 or incompetence, were
too unpopular or had been appointed by Faustin
Twagiramungu or Pierre-Celestin Rwigyema. They
were replaced by freshly trained RPF cadres.81
It would have been impossible, however, for the
NEC to control all sector nominations. The great
majority of candidates, who posed no threat for the
election of the district executives, were only
screened by the NEC, which, after all, was seeking
to identify genuine future leaders who could later
be recruited into the government82. While control
over candidacies for the 530 most senior executive
positions on district councils was probably
absolute,83 the electorate was asked to chose more
than 2,700 representatives.
1. Problematic Candidacies
Prospective candidates had at least to have
completed secondary education.84 Most people in
rural areas apart from schoolteachers could not
meet this requirement. This goes a long way to
explaining the high numbers of unopposed
candidates, especially for positions reserved for
youth and women. Candidacies were also low for
other reasons. Gitarama, for instance, registered 44
per cent single candidacies for the general posts.85
Butare, a city and district known as the
“intellectual capital of Rwanda” and dominated by
francophone Tutsis, registered 52 per cent single
candidacies for general posts – the highest in the
country.  The lack of qualified candidates
particularly affected the counsellor posts set aside
for women.  In Kigali, 36 sectors (84 per cent) had
just one woman candidate.86
                                                          
80 A complaint expressed directly to Paul Kagame by the
population, for instance, while touring Kibungo province
in August 2000. Cf. Grands Lacs Hebdo, N°209, 24-30
août 2000.
81 Interview ICG, former RPF Cadre, Brussels, 9 July
2001; western diplomats Kigali, 25 January 2001.
82 All elected counsellors shall go to solidarity camps once
elected and ICG interview, Rwandan political analyst,
Kigali, 31 January 2001.
83 Five executive positions for every districts.
84 Art 11, Chap 3, N42/2000 of 15 December2000, Law
instituting the organisation of elections of leaders at the
grass-roots level in Rwanda
85 Cf. POER press statement 5 March 2001
86 The reluctance of Rwandan women to participate in
public affairs has traditionally been ascribed to lack of
self-confidence.
The lack of volunteers sometimes forced the
administration to recruit candidates. On 22
January, two days after the closure date for
candidates to submit their papers, the total number
of candidacies was 7,256. A week later the figure
had risen to 8,431. The final figure of accepted
candidacies was 8,175, some 900 more than when
applications were officially closed. Many of these
last minute candidates were not given the option of
refusing to stand. In many cases, local
bourgmestres recruited them. In Gitarama, the
local prefect dispatched an assistant to Taba
district to recruit candidates in schools, where
teachers were simply told to write their names
down and that the rest of the necessary information
would be collected later.87 Other candidates were
summarily informed that they had been chosen to
run.88
The only people to have completed secondary
education in rural areas were often teachers and
therefore constituted the overwhelming majority of
candidates. All candidates in the district of Mutura
in Gitarama were teachers except for the outgoing
burgomaster.89. In Buringa sector, the communal
administration dispatched the school inspector to
complete the candidate list. The inspector
summoned the teachers she believed were suitable,
who then discovered that rather than being called
for a school meeting they had been chosen to stand
for election in their respective sectors.90 In
Ruyumba district in Gitarama, sector counsellors
directly intervened at the sector level to find youth
and women candidates. All the youth and women
candidates for Birambo, Gihembe and Nyarukaba
sectors were picked by their respective sector
counsellors.91
                                                          
87 ICG observation report, Gitarama, March 2001.
88 In the Ntongwe district of Gitarama, faced with a similar
problem, the local burgomaster convened an urgent
meeting of all sector counsellors and urged them to recruit
people in their respective sectors who fulfilled the
education criteria in order to get them to run in the
election. Approximately half all candidates in the district
put their names down on the last day, 20 January. Youth
candidates for Rutabo and Gitovu sectors confirmed
having put their names down following the orders of their
sector counsellors.
89 In the Mutura district of Gitarama, four teachers were
constrained to put their names forward in the election:
Ngirumpatse, Christophe Kabera, Pascasie
Nyirabariyanga, and Anastase Nyirimpeta.
90 ICG observation report, Gitarama, March 2001.
91 ICG observation report, Gitarama, March 2001
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The local administration’s role in the selection of
candidates was not limited to cases where
candidates were too few. In some instances, sector
counsellors actively sought candidates because the
volunteers were deemed unsuitable, not popular
enough, or unresponsive to Kigali’s priorities.
Alice Mukamana in the Bimomwe sector of
Ruyumba district was made to stand against
Triphine Mukankusi, a genocide survivor who was
not deemed popular enough in her sector by the
administration.92
The great majority of candidates in Gisenyi were
RPF members.93  The military was directly
implicated in forced recruitment to the party RPF.
Théogene Mudahakana, the burgomaster of Karago
commune, compelled the candidates of Mutura,
with the help of the 47th battalion of the RPA, to
join the RPF.  Meetings took place in military
camps, presided over by military officers.94 The
soldiers from those brigades later went on to vote
in the elections. Similarly, in January and February
2001, the prefect of Kibungo, Eugene Barikana,
visited all the communes of the province in order
to find candidates who would accept RPF
ideology. Three months before the elections,
Barikana replaced six bourgmestres in different
communes of the province.95  It was made clear to
those removed that they were neither expected nor
allowed to participate in the elections. Francois
Bizimana, who had been burgomaster of
Kabarondo commune, was ordered not to run in
the election during a meeting of the local branch of
the RPF.96
In the end, political interference was very high in
Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, and very significant in
Gitarama, Kibungo and probably other provinces
of the country. It did not guarantee that the
influence of Kigali was respected in all the
districts, as local politics often have a life of their
own, but whether engineering from above or at the
district level, the RPF was insistent. The only level
at which it was caught relatively unprepared and
forced to innovate at the last minute to find
additional candidacies was for the elective
                                                          
92 Ibidem
93Christophe Kabera, Ambroise Gasabaganya and Marie
Bugenimana in the district of Mutura are all part of the
RPF.
94 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 2001
95 In the communes of Rusumo, Nyarubuye, Birenga,
Sake, Mugesera and Kabarondo.
96 ICG observation report, Kibungo, March 2001
positions (actually the great majority) which
involved deliberative functions but no decision-
making. Many rural opinion leaders had
understood that the elections for executive
positions were arranged in advance and refused to
support the system by seeking relatively
inconsequential district counsellor positions.
2. Campaign Controls
The electoral law required candidates to campaign
under the supervision of the electoral commission
and prohibited any party involvement. This was
also aimed at limiting influence of wealthy and
powerful candidates, who were potentially
subversive. Commissioners made repeated
derogatory reference to the “methods of the past”,
by which they meant such practices as candidates
buying rounds of drinks in the local bar.97
The local commissions allotted candidates an equal
length of time – normally five or ten minutes – to
present their projects and ideas. All were
scrupulously timed. The local commissions also
devoted considerable effort to educating the public
in the voting process and the electoral system.
Restrictions on campaigning, and the NEC’s close
supervision facilitated the re-election of
incumbents as district mayors or their nomination
to district executive committees since they were
the only candidates already widely known. The
commission guarded against the appearance of any
political or ethnic sectarianism in election
platforms, strictly forbidding candidates to run
along ethnic lines. Indeed, each candidate was
thoroughly briefed on what was and was not
allowed. They were told that they were forbidden
to raise ideological or political issues but were
instead expected to advocate personal projects for
the benefit of the population with a emphasis on
such local issues as the education or availability
and access to water or education.
The electoral law was not universally respected.
The outgoing burgomaster for the commune of
Mugina in Gitarama, Donat Nshimyumukiza, was
accused by the electoral commission of
campaigning illegally in sectors of the
neighbouring commune that were to be annexed to
his commune to form Mugina district. Pressed by
the burgomaster of the latter commune, the
                                                          
97 ICG observation report, Gitarama, district Kamonyi,
March 2001.
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commission refused Nshimyumukiza’s candidacy
in Mugina district. However, Nshimyumukiza
subsequently ran in the elections in Ntongwe
commune. He explained to the local burgomaster
that he had been sent by the RPF and called official
meetings of the sector committees following which
counsellors were taken to a cabaret and told who to
vote for.98
The entire local administration apparatus was at
times mobilised to ensure the election of selected
candidates by organising and financing campaigns.
In Gisenyi, the local prefect authorised outgoing
bourgmestres to deduct a certain amount of money
from the communal fund to finance their
campaigns, which people outside the
administration were then employed to run. The
commission was aware of this, but did not act.99
Only one new burgomaster was elected in Gisenyi
province, Cleophas Ntarisoba, a Hutu mayor of
Kanama district, who beat Ignace Uwamungu – the
former Tutsi burgomaster of the commune –
despite the illegal campaign that the administration
financed and ran on Uwamungu’s behalf.100
In some cases, local political groups with a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo organised
illegal campaigns parallel to those supervised by
the NEC. When, as in Rusumo, Kibungo, both the
prefect and the military leant their weight to these
local political interests, there was little the
administration could do.101
While illegal campaigning was tacitly condoned in
some parts of the country, in others, individuals
risked imprisonment if they openly questioned a
candidate’s credentials. In Cyeru district, sector
Ndago, of Ruhengeri province, a former counsellor
was imprisoned for twelve days for publicly
criticising the candidacy of the outgoing
burgomaster.  The outgoing burgomaster was
extremely unpopular in the district. He had served
since 1994, and was accused of failing to protect
the population against raids by ex-FAR and
Interahamwe militias between 1996 and 1998.102
Despite his record, the members of the Electoral
College, sensitised by the local district
administration, voted him back in., and the critical
counsellor was punished by the sector committee
                                                          
98 Ibid.
99 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 2001
100 Ibid.
101 ICG observation report, Kibungo, March 2001.
102 ICG interview, Ruhengeri, 12 March 2001
for pursuing a counter-campaign in violation of the
electoral law.
D. VOTING AND RESULT
People voted on 6 March in impressive numbers.
The technology involved - i.e. the printing of
candidate photos on ballot papers - was mastered
remarkably well, and very few irregularities were
reported by national and international observers.103
The national participation rate was 96.08 per cent,
with the lowest figure in Kigali town at 90.08 per
cent. The NEC moreover prides itself that 86,9 per
cent of the newly elected counsellors had no
previous relations with the provincial
administration104. In the respect, the RPF objective
of identifying a new generation of new rural
leaders has probably been met. Their election
carries no risk since most of them only have
consultative powers in the new district assemblies,
where their behaviour will be further tested for
RPF recruitment.
Nevertheless, legitimate reservations can be raised
about the democratic quotient in the elections.
According to a local observer, the people
considered the elections the “ordinary run of state
affairs”. It was accepted that some candidates were
to be voted in, others not. Both voters and
candidates were aware of the role they were
expected to play.105
People feared being arrested or menaced if they did
not vote, particularly in provinces like Gisenyi
with a strong military presence. Soldiers made it
clear to citizens that they were expected and
required to vote. President Kagame himself
declared to Radio Rwanda on 18 February 2001,
that voting was not compulsory but if you did not
vote: "you'd better have a good excuse"106. Many
believed that it would henceforth be compulsory to
                                                          
103 Cf. POER, « Rapport intérimaire sur les élections au
Rwanda », mimeo, mars 2001 ; Coordinateur PNUD,
« Rapport préliminaire de l’observation électorale
internationale », mars 2001.
104 République rwandaise, Commission électorale
nationale, “Elections des autorités administratives des
districts et des villes au Rwanda du 6 au 13 mars 2001 :
résultats sommaires », mai 2001.
105 ICG interview, local observer, Kigali, 7 March 2001
106 POER, "Rapport sur les élections de mars 20001",
op.cit., p. 7.
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carry the card bearing the “Yatoye” stamp as proof
of having voted107.
Eighty-six of the 106 district mayors elected were
incumbent bourgmestres. Skilful lobbying, the
adept use of Rwanda’s highly centralised local
administration and a favourable electoral system
contributed to this impressive figure. In most
districts, members of the Electoral College had
been “sensitised” into voting for a particular
candidate -- usually the burgomaster with whom
they had been working for the past year or two. In
short, there was little room for surprises in this
second stage of the elections. The new district
mayors had presided over the cell and sector
executive elections of March 1999, over the
selection, that is, of the officials who were now to
elect them and who would themselves shortly be
seeking new mandates.108 The system in place was
"incestuous" and naturally favoured the status quo.
Since the vote was secret, there were no absolute
guarantees that the incumbents would be elected.
Still, the promotion of one burgomaster by another
was often enough to ensure victory.  Bourgmestres
from communes that had been incorporated into
larger districts following the re-drawing of
electoral boundaries often entered into
arrangements with the neighbouring commune’s
burgomaster or were forced to do so by higher
administrative authorities. In the north-western
province of Gitarama, for example, the commune
of Taba was integrated in Kamonyi district
following the electoral re-drawing. The local
burgomaster withdrew from the elections after the
prefect backed the outgoing burgomaster from the
district of Runda. Similarly, in Kigali rural, the
outgoing bourgmestres of the former Tare and
Mbogo communes agreed between each other not
to compete for the position of mayor of Rulindo
district, a new district incorporating both their
former communes. The Tare burgomaster
eventually ran in the election in another newly
                                                          
107 The local observers stress that during the sensitisation
campaign, some provincial administration leaders had
announced that voting was a "civic duty". In Kinyarwanda,
the word "ugomba" was used, which does not differentiate
between "duty" and "obligation". In the end the right to
abstain was not recognised. Cf. POER, "Rapport sur les
élections de Mars 2001", op. cit., p. 7.   
108 Cell and sector executives were initially elected only
for two years and should have sought a fresh mandate
before the district elections. Now, the cell and sector
executive elections have been postponed to 2002.
formed district, Kabuga, on the invitation of its
former burgomaster, Théogene Kalinamaryo, who
himself then ran in the Kanombe district of the city
of Kigali, part of which had formerly stood within
his commune109. Kalinamaryo then convened
communal meetings in his former commune to
promote his candidate, the Tare burgomaster. Since
154 outgoing bourgmestres were competing for 91
district mayor posts and fifteen mayoral seats, the
probability that incumbents would dominate the
election was very high.
When local political interests were in competition,
collaboration with the national RPF leadership was
necessary. This was most strongly felt in the north-
western province of Gisenyi, which saw some of
the worst fighting during the 1997/98 raids by
Hutu infiltrators and ex-FAR and retains a
considerable military presence. RPF committees
and followers in Gisenyi directly forced candidates
to step down in favour of their candidates, forcibly
enrolled candidates into the RPF, or recruited
potential RPF sympathisers as candidates. RPF
committees recommended the election of the
burgomaster of the former Karago commune,
Théogene Mudahakana, over that of the
burgomaster of Giciye commune, Valentin
Nizeyimana. Nyirabagoyi, another rival of
Mudahakana’s, was also forced to step down110. In
Rwerere district, Gisenyi, the district
administration simply called for a meeting of all
sector committees and circulated a list of the five
members of the executive committee for whom
they were requested to vote.
But local and national political interests sometimes
did not necessarily coincide. In the province of
Kibungo, the state's decentralisation policies ran
counter to Eugene Barikana’s efforts to establish a
network of personal supporters. The local
administration did everything in Rusumo district to
re-elect the outgoing burgomaster, Henry
Rwagasana. He was unopposed to succeed himself
as district mayor in Kirehe sector because the
military and local defence forces intimidated other
would-be candidates.111Despite having been
recruited by the RPF to stand in that election,
Balthasar Mukezabera, a Hutu returnee, received
death threats that forced him to withdraw.
Mukezabera was Kigali’s best choice, a new Hutu
                                                          
109 ICG observation report, Kigali rural, March 2001
110 ICG observation report, Gisenyi, March 2001
111 ICG observation report, Kibungo, March 2001.
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leader who could have boosted the popularity and
outreach of the system. Rwagasana, however, was
backed by both the prefect and the military
commander for the Kibungo, Byumba and Mutara
region, Colonel Gashayija, who were present
during the vote of the Electoral College to
encourage his victory.112.
The bigger the stakes, the less the risk the
administration was willing to take. Thus, the
mayor of Kigali was elected via a doubly indirect
system. Counsellors-elect voted for representatives
of their district at the city council who then went
on to run for mayor or assistant mayor. This vote
was taken in a gathering of all cell representatives
and sector counsellors city-wide. The law states
that the election should take place only once all
district and city counsellors have been sworn in
during a public oath-taking ceremony.113 The
elapsed time between the elections of district
administrators and the mayor guaranteed an
opportunity to lobby as further insurance that the
“right” candidate would win. Jeanne Gakuba, a
member of the newly elected city council who was
believed to aspire to the mayor’s office, was
contacted directly by the secretary general of the
RPF, Charles Murigande, who urged her not to
stand for mayor, but offered her instead the post of
gender and women’s development secretary.
Gakuba had little choice but to accept, and she won
the proffered position on election day with 95 per
cent of the vote.114 .
Théoneste Mutsindashyaka, ex-secretary general of
the Ministry of Labour and Public Function, was
elected Kigali’s mayor. His rival, opposition party
MDR secretary Christian Marara suspected a
conspiracy to prevent him from running. He had
privately declared that while it was possible to
trick the twenty individuals on the district council,
one could not trick or influence the 800 on the
capital’s Electoral college and that he logically
expected victory.  But Mutsindashyaka won with
over 90 per cent of the vote.115
The co-ordination of all participants during the
second stage of the elections was such that there
was hardly any hesitation when candidates stepped
                                                          
112 Ibid.
113 Art.66 Section 2, Law N07/2001 of 19 January 2001
establishing the organisation and administration of the city
of Kigali
114 ICG observation report, Kigali, March 2001.
115 Ibid.
up for posts on the district executive committees or
city councils. In Nyarugenge and Nyamirambo
districts in Kigali, two prominent local figures
were easily elected as mayors, respectively
Augustin Kampayana, outgoing burgomaster for
Nyarugenge, and Gervais Dusbemungu, the
outgoing under-prefect of Kigali. City counsellors
were elected directly and only by the members of
the newly chosen district council. The scope for
political pressure thus increased as the size of the
Electoral College decreased. During the election
for city counsellors in the Nyamirambo district of
Kigali, three candidates stood for three places.
Prior agreement was clear, despite the significant
political gamble of risking a place on the district
executive committee for a possible one on the city
council. Generally, the biggest political players
applied for the posts.116
Since only 106 of 154 districts remained in the
country after the re-drawing of the electoral
boundaries, 48 bourgmestres could not be re-
elected. In many cases, these went on to be chosen
for the second most important position on the local
council, secretary of finance. In Gisenyi, two
bourgmestres lost their districts after the re-
drawing. The burgomaster of Karago commune
(merged with Giciye commune) became Secretary
of Finance in the district’s new administration
while the Giciye burgomaster became mayor. In
this case, the candidate backed by the authorities
failed to get elected but the choice remained in the
hands of prominent local politicians without scope
for real change.
In the second stage of the elections, the secrecy of
the ballot was respected, but in the overwhelming
majority of cases the candidates that were expected
to go through did, and most with very little
competition.  In the Cyanwarze district of Gisenyi,
the identity of four out of five of the newly elected
district executive committee was known before the
elections, as well as the identity of the mayor for
Kigali. All the newly elected mayors in Gisenyi
and Ruhengeri were part of the RPF. Despite the
secret ballot, the “right” candidate still won. This
was partly explained by the rigorous selection of
candidates, partly by lobbying, and partly by the
disinterest and lack of motivation among
                                                          
116 Sheh Abdul Karim Harelimana, Ex-Minister of the
interior, Antoine Mugesera, prominent member of the
NGO IBUKA, and Christian Marara, secretary general of
the main opposition party MDR.
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Rwandans who did not believe the election could
influence the system. Through their cell and
abakazi representatives, voters were aware of
which candidates the most influential local
personality – often a RPF member - would back,
and mostly they voted for that individual.
The voters' choice is understandable. Rwandans
are tired of conflict. They tend to prefer candidates
who are likely to bring dispensaries, roads and
schools to their impoverished localities, and
appease the security apparatus, rather than
opposition candidates, who risk bringing nothing
but trouble.
E. OBSERVATION OF THE ELECTIONS
International observers concentrated on whether
the elections could be described as “free and fair”.
The international community did not give itself the
means, however, to evaluate the credibility of the
poll fully. It loosely co-ordinated observers under a
UNDP umbrella, marginally funded local efforts
and provided some guidelines on what to look for.
A consultant endeavoured to ensure that diplomatic
observers were dispatched throughout the country.
But international observation was essentially
passive, concentrated on the events of 6 March
rather than on the earlier activities of the electoral
commission. It did not assess the commission’s
independence, observe the registration of voters or
the selection of candidates.117. Despite their
concerns over human rights abuses inside the
country and the military intervention in the Congo,
most donors are convinced that “this government is
going in the right direction.” Since “it has achieved
tremendous results since 1994”, many are ready to
support it without asking too many questions.118 If
they sometimes privately agree that some things
are going seriously wrong, there is a general
consensus to give the government a smooth ride
and an opportunity to sort out its security
problems, at least until the end of the transition
period in 2003.
Local observers faced a more challenging
environment. The NGO Ligue pour la Défense des
Droits de l’Homme dans les Grands Lacs (LDGL)
                                                          
117 Cf. “Rapport préliminaire de l’observation électorale
internationale”, préparé par le consultant coordinateur
PNUD, 10 March 2001.
118 ICG interviews, diplomatic corps, Kigali, February-
March 2001.
brought together six civil society groups to form an
election monitoring civil society caucus in October
2000, the “Programme d’observation des élections
au Rwanda” (POER), based on the prescriptions
enshrined in the Arusha accords of 1993.  During
the course of the elections, POER sent 96 members
into the field, grouped in twelve teams to cover all
of Rwanda’s provinces.
The combination of the haste with which the
electoral law was passed and POER’s late start
produced incomplete observation. Though planned
in October 2000, POER did not take off until
February 2001, only weeks before the start of the
elections. To begin, it had to gain legal recognition
from the Ministry for Local Government
(MINALOC). Though the relationship with the
government was often labelled “good”, the
administration did little to facilitate POER’s
existence or work. Authorisation from NEC to
observe the elections was received only when there
was in effect little left to observe. The campaign
began on 15 February but the commission
distributed official observation credentials only on
2 March, a mere two days before the end of the
period.119
According to the Fédération Internationale de la
ligue des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH),120 the
Rwandan secret services infiltrate human rights
groups in order to quell dissident voices, rather
than directly persecuting them. The infiltrators are
tasked to report on the ideological and political
positions of NGO members, and in some cases
they are able to change the political orientation of
the groups. Such tactics have largely succeeded in
breaking up the Rwandan local NGO network
since 1996.121 Within POER, the powerful
genocide survivors association IBUKA vetoed
press statements before release.122 Its executive
secretary, who had become executive secretary of
POER in February 2001, made sure the local
observers stayed in line. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the local observers were docile. It
did not, and perhaps could not act, as the guarantor
of free and transparent elections that it stated was
its purpose. Nevertheless, it made a good first
attempt that emphasised the importance of similar
                                                          
119 Ibid.
120 Fédération Internationale de la ligue des Droits de
l’Homme, Rapport annuel 1999, p. 60.
121 ICG interview, Human Rights activist, Kigali, 13
March 2001
122 ICG interview, POER member, Kigali, 12 March 2001.
“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections
ICG Africa Report N°34, 9 October 2001                                                                                                                            Page 21
operations being undertaken during future national
contests.
V. CONCLUSION
As this report has shown, the March 2001 elections
were far from being free even though they were
fair in terms of the ballots cast. The people of
Rwanda had little to do with the choice of district
mayors or of the Mayor of Kigali, contrary to what
the government claims, but in most sectors, they
did freely chose their representatives within the
tight framework set by the electoral commission. A
new generation of “wise men”, fitting the RPF
definition of good leadership, had the opportunity
to come forward and contest for a limited mandate.
Were these elections meaningful in terms of
democratisation? They were politically meaningful
for the RPF regime as an element of its political
strategy, but the tight political control applied to
the entire process undermined its democratic
potential. In the end the elections allowed little
meaningful expression of views, even at local
level, outside the proscribed framework of national
unity and reconciliation. Their result was “virtual”,
an image of near perfection rather than a reflection
of the diverse social reality of Rwanda.
This "electoral experiment" sends mixed signals
about democratisation to the people of Rwanda
because it also happened in a context of political
repression of the opposition. The RPF has been
busy recruiting new members and officials
throughout the country, but all other parties have
found themselves in trouble for attempting to do
so. Conveniently, the RPF dominated government
is also the sole judge of political behaviour,
according to the spirit of national unity and
reconciliation. Opposition political figures
perceive this as a clear indication that the
authorities do not intend to permit them to make a
genuine challenge in free and fair elections when
the transition period comes to an end in two years
time.
The demotion and departure of Minister Théobald
Rwaka Gakwaya, followed by Supreme Court
Magistrate, Col. Cyiza, were only two of the latest
developments in this respect. Both were accused of
recruiting supporters for the Parti Démocrate
Chrétien (PDC) in secret meetings in Cyangugu in
September 2000, and were under pressure from the
RPF to fall into line. Similarly, the Executive
Bureau of the Mouvement Démocratique
Républicain (MDR) was suspended by the Minister
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for Local Government, Desire Nyandwi, after
attacks by some of its members against its interim
leader, Célestin Kabanda. This is the latest episode
in a long series of systematic moves to destroy
whatever credibility the party had kept as a
possible opposition force in the coming national
elections. Other parties, including the Parti Social
Démocrate (PSD) and the Parti Libéral (PL) have
been similarly destroyed through the tight
surveillance of the parliament-based “Forum of
political parties,” led by RPF Secretary-General
Charles Murigande. Former President Pasteur
Bizimungu and his aides, have also been subjected
to intimidation123.
By restricting political discourse to the rubric of
"national unity" and "consensual democracy", the
RPF leaves little option for opponents but exile, or
clandestine operation. By controlling all political
activities and refusing to countenance the slightest
electoral defeat, the RPF suggests that it does not
believe it can achieve its goals within the
institutional framework it purports to be building.
To many Rwandans, initiatives like the 2001
district elections and the decentralisation reforms
appear a charade, conducted largely for the benefit
of the international community.
Certain contradictions in the RPF’s philosophy are
apparent. Its favoured manner of conducting a
discourse on national unity and reconciliation is
top-down – inconsistent in procedure at least with
the professed principles of decentralisation. A
close examination of the March 2001 electoral
process suggests that it will be at least very
difficult for the authorities to both impose
consensus from above and reflect the country’s
diverse interests. The government must ask and
find answers to a number of questions before there
can be much optimism that the national elections in
2003 will truly seal Rwanda’s transition to stability
and democracy. These include: how do Rwandans
perceive their own government? Are there genuine
channels of communications in place between the
citizenry, which is 95 per cent rural, and the
country’s leadership? How can the opposition
express itself non-violently inside the country?
Where do the external threat stop and the internal
one begin?
                                                          
123 ICG will publish a more thorough report on the
complex issue of political pluralism in post-genocide
Rwanda within the next three months.
A change of political course is needed to rebuild
trust and confidence in the government. The
constitution-making process ahead and the
upcoming national polls give the RPF
opportunities to liberalise political activity. It is
critical that the decentralisation policy succeeds.
Bringing accountability and responsibility for the
management of their own affairs to the
communities could be Rwanda’s true revolution124.
It would change the face of administration and help
establish democratic governance in the rural areas.
For this policy to work, Kigali must actually give
financial, political and administrative autonomy to
the districts. Simple administrative
deconcentration, which leaves power in the hands
of provincial administrations, would be counter-
productive. If devolution is not supported by the
creation of a specific administrative corps, for
instance, specialising in local government policy
management and independent of the central
government, it will largely remain a paper
exercise. According to the new law, the district
executive secretaries, who actually run the district
administrations, are appointed by “the district
council after a competitive examination”125 but
their relation to the provincial executive secretaries
– themselves members of the central government –
and to the security services remains unclear.
Moreover, the administrative chain of authority --
from the Office of the President, to the hills -- is
under control of an omnipresent security apparatus,
which shadows the official system.126 This over-
centralised structure is also incompatible with
democratic decentralisation. As long as local
government has no capacity to implement policies
autonomously, accountability will remain directed
towards the president, and the people of Rwanda
will find themselves burdened by a new array of
                                                          
124 The first social Revolution brought down in 1959 the
Tutsi monarchy, which, under the influence and the
authority of colonial powers, had become an instrument of
domination of the Hutu masses and had degenerated into a
ruthless and extremely oppressive social institution. The
social revolution degenerated itself very quickly into an
oppressive movement. It lead to recurrent ethnic pogroms
and was used as a justification for the Hutu dictatorships
of the 1st and 2nd Republics, forcing hundreds of thousands
of innocent Tutsi families to seek refuge out of the
country.
125 Art. 79 of the Law N°04/2001 establishing the
organisation and functioning of the district, published in
the Rwanda gazette on 13 January 2001.
126 ICG interview, Rwandan Human Rights activist, Kigali,
18 January 2001.
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useless elected counsellors, prone to endless
politicking, abuse of office and corruption.127
The tight intelligence and security grip can and
should be loosened. Not all of Rwanda’s
communes are threatened by militia infiltration.
The military, including the DMI, should have
nothing to do with management of civilian
government or vetting of candidates. The new
districts need to be freed from military interference
in their affairs. If the Local Defence Forces are to
become the local police, supporting the
enforcement of district regulations and
implementing gacaca decisions, they should be
professionalised and separated from the military.
The NEC, as it operated in the March elections, is
both too powerful and too partisan. Its close
connections with the ruling establishment, both at
national and local levels, make it a tool of political
control, not an independent and transparent
institution. The initial law should be reviewed to
set up a truly autonomous NEC on a permanent
basis. The recruitment of staff, both nationally and
locally, should be open and transparent, without
interference from the authorities, including the
security services. It must build trust in its neutrality
and commitment to organising elections that will
be fair to all political forces. A permanent
independent monitoring mechanism of the NEC
should also be immediately set up and funded by
the international community.
Election observation cannot be efficiently handled
on an ad-hoc basis. It requires technical expertise
and intimate knowledge of the political field,
capacity building and constant monitoring of
government departments. Local and national
elections usually follow each other at two to three-
year intervals. Preparations start six to twelve
months in advance. There is, therefore, a good case
to establish a countrywide network of election
observers, with training and organisation supported
by the international community. Such a network
would be vital to the long-term strengthening of
democracy.
Political differences are not necessarily divisive if
space is provided for free debate. But the
consensus methodology adopted by the
government, however, operates in an oppressive
manner. It is urgent, therefore, for Rwanda to
                                                          
127 As in Kenya for instance.
liberalise the activities of political parties, the
media and civil society. If opposition parties are
not given the opportunity to rebuild themselves
and present a fair challenge to the RPF well in
advance of the 2003 national elections, the entire
democratic logic that the government says it wants
to institutionalise will be crushed. Such restrictions
on political activities that are retained should apply
equally to all.  The political playing field should
become level, and the RPF should no longer
benefit from being the sole legal political operative
in the country.
Rwandan society is still largely traumatised by
political conflict and the genocide. This does not
mean, however, that all political freedoms should
be sacrificed in the name of national unity and
reconciliation.  The opening of political party
activities and restoration of basic political
freedoms can be gradual, involving first the
restoration of freedom of association and freedom
of the press and only later freedom of public
assembly for mass political rallies. The office of an
independent ombudsman should be created to offer
advice and recommendations--and possibly
mediation-- to Rwandan citizens in case of
conflicting interpretations of laws and procedures
with the government. At least six months before
the presidential and parliamentary elections,
opposition parties should obtain the right to
campaign openly if the democratic transition is to
be genuine and an independent national electoral
commission should be created to supervise
electoral procedures.   
The international community should take the
opportunity of the constitution-making process to
discuss with the government what guarantees will
be provided for political freedom and what
limitations will be set on the political role of the
security services. It should support financially and
politically capacity building for the establishment
of a permanent, independent election observation
program. An election observation program is
central to the credibility and legitimacy of national
elections in 2003.
Rwanda is now at a crucial stage of its post
genocide reconstruction and reconciliation process.
Having been now in power for seven years, the
RPF has the responsibility to be accountable to the
people of Rwanda, and not simply to itself, its
military leadership or its own ideology. Otherwise,
its runs the risk of being seen as performing solely
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for the financial resources of the international
community, betraying the original aims and beliefs
that motivated the sacrifices of its supporters, to
stay in power. After seven years in office, and
despite legitimate needs for safeguarding national
security, the political trend evident in the 6 March
elections demonstrates that the risk of such a
betrayal is real. A warning from the international
community is warranted to prompt the RPF to
deliver on its own political promises.
Nairobi/Brussels, 9 October 2001
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APPENDIX A
MAP OF RWANDA
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-Beginning of the war launched by the RPF




-Adoption of a new constitution legalising
the multiparty system of government. Soon
after the enactment of the new Law on
political parties, the Mouvement
Démocratique Républicain (MDR), Parti
Social-Démocrate (PSD) and the Parti
Liberal (PL) are launched.
July
-Beginning of the Arusha negotiations




-Massacres of Tutsi populations and
opponents to the MRND regime in the
prefectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye,
Byumba and the Bugesera region of Kigali
rural. The RPF retaliates by breaking the
cease-fire and attacking Byumba and
Ruhengeri prefectures. Close to one million
Internally Displaced People (IDPs) surround
Kigali.
October
-Signature of the Arusha agreement.
1994
April
-7: The plane transporting President Juvénal
Habyarimana and President Cyprien
Ntaryamira from Burundi is shot down over
Kigali. Genocide against Rwanda’s Tutsi
population is unleashed by the Interahamwe
militias and Forces Armées Rwandaises
(FAR). Close to 800,000 people are killed in
the following hundred days, including
thousands of Hutu opponents to the
Habyarimana regime.
July
-The RPF takes over Kigali.
October
-A government of National unity including
opposition party to the Habyarimana regime
is formed in Kigali with the objective to




-Dismissal of MDR Prime Minister Faustin
Twagiramungu, Minister for justice
Alphonse-Marie Nkubito (independent) and
RPF Minister for Interior Seth Sendashonga.
Pierre Célestin Rwigyema (MDR) becomes
Prime Minister and Alexis Kanyarengwe
(RPF) Minister for Interior.
1996
April:
-A previously unknown organisation,
“Peuple en Armes pour la libération du
Rwanda” (PALIR) claims to be launching a
war against the RPA from the prefecture of
Cyangugu and puts a price on the heads of
all US Citizens inside the country, in
retaliation to their government military
support to the RPF regime.
July:
-Human Rights Watch and the International
Federation for Human Rights accuse the
RPA of killings judicial and government
local officials in addition to numerous
civilians in their blind reprisal operations
against Hutu militias still roaming the hills.
-Seth Sendashonga (former RPF Home
Affairs Minister) and Faustin Twagiramungu
(former MDR prime Minister) launch their
own opposition movement, the “Forces de
résistance pour la démocratie” (FDR).
-Beginning of the first Congo war.
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September:
-Two Rwandan exiles, including Col.
Théoneste Lizende, an ex-FAR who had
defected to the RPA in 1994 but fled
Rwanda in 1995, are assassinated in Nairobi.
The Kenyan government closes the Rwandan
embassy.
November1996 to January 1997
-One million and two hundred thousand
Rwandan refugees come back: approx.
700,000 from Zaire (now DRC), and 500,000
from Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. In the
weeks following their return, crimes against
survivors and witnesses of the genocide by
Hutu militias increase dramatically, followed
by merciless reprisals on the population by
the RPA.
-Froduald Karamira, former Vice-president
of the MDR-power faction is sentenced to
death by the Rwandan courts.
1997
January
-Beginning of the government's villagisation
policy to improve rural communities
security, the provision of basic services, and
control over movements of population.
March
-Extensive reshuffle and final break with the
distribution of positions set-up by the
October 1993 Arusha Agreement. Col.
Joseph Karemera is appointed Minister for
Education, Patrick Mazimpaka leaves the
Ministry for national rehabilitation to be
appointed without portfolio in the office of
the President and Alexis Kanyaregwe, RPF
chairman leaves the Ministry for interior.
April
-The “Law on the Control of the Executive”,
reinforcing parliament’s powers against the
government is voted amidst protest of
president Pasteur Bizimungu (RPF) and
Transitional National Assembly speaker
Juvénal Nkusi (PSD). The latter is voted out




-RPF national congress at Kicukiro. Major-
general Paul Kagame is elected President of
the RPF in place of former Minister for
interior, Alexis Kanyarengwe. Rwanda
president Pasteur Bizimungu becomes RPF
Vice-President, replacing Minister Patrick
Mazimpaka, and Prof. Charles Murigande,
rector the Rwanda National University in
Butare takes the seat of secretary general,
previously held by Théogene Rudasingwa.
April
-Twenty-one men and one woman sentenced
to death by Rwandan courts for crimes of
genocide are executed in public on four sites
throughout the country. Froduald Karamira is
one of them, executed in Nyamirambo
stadium, Kigali, site of some of the worst
collective massacres during the genocide
-Beginning of the Hutu militias insurgency in
the north-western provinces of Ruhengeri
and Gisenyi.
May
-Beginning of the Saturday meetings at the
Urugwiro village (Kigali) between members
of the cabinet, the executive bureau of the
TNA, the presidents of TNA commissions,
leaders of National organisations (civil
society, parties), prefects and other local
wise men or clerics. The objective of these
meetings, which are going to take place
almost every Saturday until March 1999, is
to achieve consensus within leaders of the
country on key issues for future policies.
-UN secretary-general Koffi Anan on official
visit to Kigali. The official dinner is
boycotted by Rwanda’s president, vice-
president and Foreign Affairs Minister due to
the UNSG refusal to apologise for the UN
responsibility in the genocide.
-The UN Human Rights mission is
suspended.
-Former Minister for Interior Seth
Sendashonga is assassinated in Nairobi.
July:
-Prime-Minister Pierre Célestin Rwigyema
(MDR) revokes MDR President Bonaventure
Ubarijoro, who will be arrested six months
later for his role in 1960’s anti-tutsi pogroms,
when he was director of the secret police
under Grégoire Kayibanda. He will then be
released a few months later. Rwigyema
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becomes the new MDR president, MP
Stanley Safari the Vice-president and
Minister for Foreign Affairs Anastase
Gasana, leader of the committee are charged
with re-formulating MDR’s ideology so as to
promote national unity.
-Creation of the Rassemblement des
rwandais démocrates (RRD), underground
opposition political movement inside the
country.
August
-Beginning of the second Congo war.
November/December
-General election of the people’s




-Election of counsellors and population
representatives at cell and sector level
through the queuing-system of voting. 95%
turn-out but voting was de-facto compulsory.
The election is labelled “open and
transparent by the UN”.
-A new discipline committee of the TNA
purges 10 MPs out of 70 appointed. The
membership and terms of appointment of this
committee are not revealed. Among these ten
MPs are three MDR who had criticised
heavily Pierre Célestin Rwigyema’s move to
unseat their party President, Bonaventure
Ubarijoro, in July 1998. The three MDR MPs
refuse to resign and are backed by TNA
speaker Joseph Sebarenzi. The charges
brought against the ten MPs range from
“participation in the genocide” to
“insufficient support for reconciliation”.
April
-Augustin Misago, the Catholic bishop of
Gikongoro is arrested and charged with
genocide.
-Prime Minister Pierre Célestin Rwigyema
apologises to the people of Rwanda on behalf
of the MDR for the party’s role in the
genocide. He is nevertheless accused by
fellow MDR leader Anastase Gasana to be
insufficiently committed to the party
reforms. Gasana calls for a thorough purge of
the party leadership.
-Launch of the National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission (NURC)
destined to guide all Rwandans towards the
eradication of ethnic hatred and ethnic
discrimination.
May
-Six more MPs are removed from the TNA
by its disciplinary committee on charges of
absenteeism, incompetence and genocide.
Speaker Joseph Sebarenzi Kabuye protests
again against the lack of legal basis for the
committee’s actions.
-The Rwanda Human Rights Commission is
created with a three year mandate. Its chair
is Gasana Ndoba, a respected human rights
activist.
June
-A committee including representatives of all
the parties present in the TNA agree to
extend the transition process by four
additional years, up to 2003. The decision is
ratified by the Cabinet a few days later.
October
-The TNA forces the resignation of three
government ministers over corruption
following the completion of a commission of
inquiry in a government vehicle procurement
deal in 1997.
-The Ministry for information is abolished
and its function transferred to the Interior
Ministry. The supervision of the media is
attributed to the Rwandan Information Office
(ORINFOR), which is also their direct
competitor. Joseph Bideri replaces Lt-Col
Wilson Rutayisire as the head of ORINFOR.
December
-Prime Minister Pierre Célestin Rwigyema
(MDR) is absolved by the TNA of any
serious wrong doing in the management of
World Bank allocated funds for the Ministry
for education despite the results of a




-Resignation and exile of TNA speaker
Joseph Sebarenzi Kabuye (PL) after a vote
calling for a debate on his alleged
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incompetence and dictatorial tendencies led
by a fellow PL party member. Sebarenzi is
accused both of dictatorial tendencies, and
complicity in a royalist plot to recruit
members of the RPA for the return of King
Kigeri V. He is replaced by Vincent Biruta
(PSD) former Minister for Public Works.
-Announcement of the creation of a 3,500
strong national police force under the
command of the Ministry of Interior, and
disbandment of the gendarmerie which was
under the Ministry for Defence.
February
-Arrest of a popular Rwandan singer
Rutabana and three RPA soldiers in Burundi
and Tanzania for complicity in the Sebarenzi
plot. Dr Josue Kayijabo, Sebarenzi’s brother
and former vice-president of Ibuka, manages
to leave the country under Belgian protection
and after official American protest over his
initial arrest. Anastase Murumba, executive
secretary of Ibuka, leaves also the country.
-Resignation of Prime Minister Pierre
Célestin Rwigyema (MDR) who had been
under pressure for several months by MDR
rival MP Stanley Safari over his alleged
involvement in the genocide and by a
parliamentary commission of inquiry over
embezzlement of funds at the Ministry for
Education. He flees Rwanda for the USA in
June and is replaced by Célestin Kabanda at
the head of the MDR in August. The position
of Prime Minister is given to former
Ambassador to Germany Bernard Makuza
(MDR).
March
-Resignation of president Pasteur Bizimungu
(RPF). Vice-President and Minister for
Defence Paul Kagame becomes acting
President. An extensive reshuffle follows in
which Minister in the Office of the President
Patrick Mazimpaka, among others, loses his
portfolio.
-Assassination of president Bizimungu
advisor and former prefect of Kibuye, Aciel
Kabera
April
-The TNA and the Cabinet elect Paul
Kagame President of Rwanda by 81 votes to
5, for RPF secretary general Prof. Charles
Murigande. Ex-FAR Col. Emmanuel
Habyarimana becomes Minister for Defence.
June
-Bishop Augustin Misago is acquitted of all
charges of genocide by a Rwanda court.
September
-Return to Rwanda of former Minister for
Justice Faustin Nteziyayo who had fled the
country in January 1999 after intense
lobbying against him organised by genocide
survivors. He is appointed vice-governor of
Rwanda’s Central Bank.
October
-National Summit of the National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission.
December
-Administrative reorganisation of the
country. Communes become districts and are
reduced from 154 to 106, including the
creation of 15 towns.
2001:
January
-Beginning of the work of the Legal and
Constitutional Commission
-Former Rwanda King Jean-Baptiste
Ndahindurwa Kigeli V expresses his wish to
return to Rwanda and calls for a referendum
on the re-establishment of the monarchy, one
month after consultations with Laurent-
Désiré Kabila in Kinshasa over the bilateral
relations of both countries.
February
-An MDR faction led by former Foreign
Affairs Minister Anastase Gasana claims to
have taken over the leadership of the party
from acting President Célestin Kabanda.
Gasana appoints himself President and Jean
de Dieu Ntiruhungwa Vice-President.
Ntiruhungwa will be appointed Interior
Minister a month later.
-Launch in Brussels of the Monarchist
movement of Joseph Ndahimana “Nation-
Imbaga y’Inyabutatu Nyarwanda".
March
-District elections are held throughout the
country.
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-Minister for Interior Théobald Rwaka
Gakwaya (PDC) is sacked over his alleged
promotion of illegal political activities in
Cyangugu.
-A new political organisation, l’ « Alliance
Rwanda's pour la renaissance de la nation »
(ARENA) led by Joseph Sebarenzi Kabuye
is formed in the USA
April
-A former national political commissar in the
Rwandan government, Maj. Alphonse
Forum, flees to Uganda alleging political
persecution
-Publication by State Prosecutor Gerard
Gahima of the updated list of categories. 1
suspects of genocide. The new list includes
the names of former Prime Minister Pierre
Célestin Rwigyema and Gikongoro bishop
Augustin Misago.
-President Kagame in a meeting with ICTR
prosecutor Carla del Ponte, guarantees full
co-operation of the Government of Rwanda
for the prosecution of RPA officers
suspected of war crimes and crimes against
humanity in 1994.
-Rwanda re-opens its embassy in France.
May
-Former President Pasteur Bizimungu is held
briefly under house arrest as he prepares to
launch his own political party. The party is
interdicted and his privileges of former
President are withdrawn. Bizimungu is
subsequently accused by Parliament to be the
leader of the insurgents and attacked by the
survivors association IBUKA to have incited
ethnic violence.
June/July
-Following renewed infiltrations of Hutu
militias and combat in Ruhengeri and
Gisenyi districts, the GoR announces that
more than 1000 rebels have been killed and
1300 captured.
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APPENDIX C
NATIONAL DECENTRALISATION POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA
(SELECTED ABSTRACTS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS)128.
                                                          
128 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Local government and Social Affairs, "National Decentralisation Policy", Imprimerie
nouvelle du Rwanda, May 2000.
“The current political, economic and social
situation of Rwanda is a direct consequence of the
recent political and administrative history of the
country the apex of which was the cataclysmic
genocide of 1994 – a genocide planned and
effectively executed by the communities and
agents of the State.
The inappropriate, highly centralised dictatorial
governance of the colonial as well as post
independence administration of the country
excluded the Rwandan population from
participating in the determination of their political,
economic and social well-being. (…)
From a political and administrative view, the
Rwandan system is largely centralised and the
following problems still persist:
(i) Inadequate participation of the majority of
the population in the making of decisions
that concern their livelihood
(ii) Inadequate financial resources and others in
Inter, Akarere and lower levels. It is true that
the Rwanda Government has limited
revenue, but the little there is, remains
concentrated at central government level.
(iii) Management structures at local
administrative levels that support lack of
accountability and transparency.
(iv) Accumulation of powers in one person, both
at the central and local level, for example, at
Akarere level, the persons are centralised in
one person, the Burgomaster.
(v) Passivity, lack of initiative and dependency
syndrome on the part of the majority of the
population, caused especially by
overcentralization and exclusion from
participation.
(vi) Inadequate capacity (human, systems,
structures, institutions, networks, attitudes,
etc.) at both central and local levels.
(vii) Officialdom which erodes further the
people’s say in the management of their
affairs, the system being generally
accountable to central government instead of
being accountable to the people.
(viii) Little presence of women and youth in the
running of the political economic and
administrative systems and affairs of
Rwanda.
A political and administrative system where
problems such as the above prevail cannot support
economic and social development precisely
because the concerned people’s energies are not
adequately mobilised to initiate, plan and
implement development action based on locally
identified needs. (…)
Decentralisation will provide a structural
arrangement for government and the people of
Rwanda to fight poverty at close range and to
enhance their reconciliation via the empowerment
of local populations. There has already been
elections at the Akagari and Umurenge levels in
1999 as part of the democratisation process.
The District council organises its work through
three commissions: economic and technical affairs;
political administrative and legal affairs; welfare
and cultural affairs. Moreover, in order to prepare
district development plans, the district executive
committee has to establish a Community and
Development Committee (CDC) composed of its
secretary in charge of finances and economic
development, acting as chairperson, a women
representative, a youth representative, and the
secretaries in charge of development at sector
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level. Finally, a district executive secretary
appointed by the Central government heads the
districts administration and manages their technical
units, being the secretary to both the executive
committees and the council.
At provincial level, the Umuyobozi (provincial
commissioner) heads the deconcentrated units of
central government and guarantees the cohesion of
administrative management through a co-
ordination committee including heads of
departments and the district mayors. He/she is
supported among others by a provincial executive
secretary who is the direct authority of all civil
servants and among them, the district executive
secretaries”.
The new administrative and political framework
set up by the decentralisation policy intends to
break with the old regime and with the colonial
legacy both in form and substance. It establishes
levels of collective consultation for decision-
making right from the bottom level of the State
pyramid, while the pyramid itself is substantially
reviewed with name and administrative boundary
changes. Proper Rwandan names are given to the
new administrative units, while the older ones,
which were of colonial origin and simply adapted







Nyumba Kumi / Ten-
house-unit










Both lower administrative levels, cells and sectors,
have a council which is supposed to elect and
                                                          
129 In its effort to cut any symbolic link with the previous
regime, the RPF has renamed most districts. These names
had been given in the early seventies at the time of the
administrative reform implementing the social revolution
policies. The wish of the RPF was to reverse to older
names of socio-cultural administrative units, which were
used and institutionalised by the monarchy and throughout
the colonisation. ICG Interview, Tito Ruteremara, Kigali,
25/01/01.
supervise an executive committee made of ten
representatives (one mayor and nine secretaries:
executive secretary; economic development;
security; education, culture and community
mobilisation; health and social affairs; youth
affairs; gender and women development; finance;
information).
The first council, at cell level, is supposed to be
constituted of all citizens resident aged 18 and
above. At sector level, the council is composed of
the executive committees’ chairs of the cell level,
two women representatives, two youth
representatives and two persons of integrity. They
are supposed to work with the technical support of
its two sub-committees, the Political and
Administrative Committee (PAC) and the
Community Development Committee (CDC). At
district level, the council is composed of one
representative of each sector, elected through
direct universal suffrage, and one third of the
women and youth representatives elected at sector
level through universal suffrage. Executive
committee members at sector level have to
relinquish their positions if they are elected
counsellors at district level. The districts’ mayors -
successors of the Communes Bourgmestres - and
four other secretaries (finance and economic
development; social services; gender and women’s
development; youth, culture and sports) are elected
from among the elected counsellors over their
inaugural meetings, by an electoral college
composed of: 1. The directly elected counsellors
themselves; 2. The executive committee members
of the sectors; 3. The chairs of the cells’ executive
committees130.
Finally, in order to control efficiently the growth of
urban centres and maximise the administration
capacity to deliver services to the population, the
decentralisation policy sets up urban local
government by creating towns and a City of
provincial status, Kigali, which is itself divided
into districts, sectors and cells. The towns benefit
from the same local government mechanisms as
the rural districts. The actual implementation of the
administrative reform took place in December
2000, as the 154 former communes were
transformed into one hundred and six new units: 91
districts and fifteen towns.
                                                          
130 Cf. Summarising table and explanatory example in
Annexe.
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Explanatory diagram summarising the local government electoral system.
March 2001 Electoral diagram for a district including 12 sectors and 60 cells
1. Sector level
Election through universal suffrage of three persons:
 1 representative of the general population
 1 women representative
 1 youth representative
2. District level (12 sectors)
12 representatives of the general population
12 women representatives
12 youth representatives
a) District council = 20 people
12 representative of the general population
1/3 of women representatives = 4
1/3 of youth representatives = 4
Total = 12 + 4 + 4 = 20
b) Election of the district mayor and other executives among the 20 members of the District council
Electoral college = 200 people
20 members of the district council
12 x 10 = 120 sector executive committee members
60 cell heads
Total = 20 + 120 + 60 = 200
Source: National Electoral Commission, January 2001.
“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections
ICG Africa Report N°34, 9 October 2001                                                                                                                            Page 34
APPENDIX D
1999 AND 2001 ELECTORAL STATISTICS























01. Gitarama 171 1097 386995 75.9 73.5 4.1 93.4
02. Kibuye 101 638 154786 91.0 22.6 7.6 85.3
03. Kibungo 119 690 250267 90.6 60.6 2.7 95.3
04. Gikongoro 126 861 187436 87.3 10.3 3.9 88.8
05. Umutara 74 425 128301 88.5 97.6 4.1 91.4
06. Gisenyi 135 865 296728 89.4 54.2 0.2 94.8
07. Cyangugu 115 691 215041 87.6 63.1 5.8 84.7
08. Ruhengeri 177 945 328400 90.6 59.7 3.8 94.1
09. Butare 205 646 268646 93.8 55.1 5.9 81.3
10. Byumba 140 800 284566 84.4 61.0 5.1 84.7
11. P.V.K. 20 91 528849 90.0 54.0 8.0 15.0
12. Kigali-
Ngali
160 1363 372317 87.0 60.0 3.0 84.0
Source: Republic of Rwanda, national electoral commission statistics, March 1999 elections.
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10 166 306 286 251 843 9 96.76
02. Kibuye 6 102 233 202 167 602 5 96.82
03.
Kibungo
10 120 266 214 214 694 6 96.53
04.
Gikongoro
7 125 244 220 197 661 6 99.03
05.
Umutara
8 80 160 121 97 378 8 94.68
06.
Gisenyi
10 135 266 228 183 677 9 96.25
07.
Cyangugu
7 115 218 157 123 498 6 96.75
08.
Ruhengeri
11 177 420 395 359 1174 11 97.57
09. Butare 10 211 386 328 293 1007 9 96.52
10.
Byumba
9 137 279 227 188 694 8 96.38
11. P.V.K. 8 43 162 97 97 378 2 90.08
12.Kigali-
Ngali
10 139 252 187 167 606 7 94.94
Total 106 1550 3192 2662 2321 8175 86 96.06
Source : Republic of Rwanda, National Electoral Commission, Elections results, May 2001.
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APPENDIX E
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private,
multinational organisation committed to
strengthening the capacity of the international
community to anticipate, understand and act to
prevent and contain conflict.
ICG’s approach is grounded in field research.  Teams
of political analysts, based on the ground in countries
at risk of conflict, gather information from a wide
range of sources, assess local conditions and produce
regular analytical reports containing practical
recommendations targeted at key international
decision-takers.
ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officials in
foreign ministries and international organisations and
made generally available at the same time via the
organisation's internet site, www.crisisweb.org ICG
works closely with governments and those who
influence them, including the media, to highlight its
crisis analysis and to generate support for its policy
prescriptions.  The ICG Board - which includes
prominent figures from the fields of politics,
diplomacy, business and the media - is directly
involved in helping to bring ICG reports and
recommendations to the attention of senior policy-
makers around the world.  ICG is chaired by former
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; former Australian
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has been President
and Chief Executive since January 2000.
ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels, with
advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and
Paris. The organisation currently operates field
projects in eighteen crisis-affected countries and
regions across three continents: Albania, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in
Europe; Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe in
Africa; and Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Asia.
ICG raises funds from governments, charitable
foundations, companies and individual donors. The
following governments currently provide funding:
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of China
(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. Foundation and private sector donors
include the Ansary Foundation, the William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation, the Open Society Institute, the
Ploughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation, the
Smith Richardson Foundation, the Ford Foundation
and the U.S. Institute of Peace.
July 2001
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APPENDIX F
ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS
AFRICA
ALGERIA
Algeria: The Press in Crisis, Africa Report N°8, 11 January
1999
Algérie: La Crise de la Presse, Africa Report N°8, 11 January
1999
The People’s National Assembly, Africa Report N°10, 16
February 1999
Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 Mois de Législature, Africa
Report N°10 16 February 1999
Elections Présidentielles en Algérie: Les Enjeux et les
Perspectives, Africa Report N°12, 13 April 1999
The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20
October 2000
La Crise Algérienne n’est pas finie, Africa Report N°24, 20
October 2000
La concorde civile : Une initiative de paix manqueé, Africa
Report N°24, 9 July 2001
BURUNDI
Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspension
of Sanctions, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999
Le Burundi Après La Suspension de L’Embargo: Aspects
Internes et Regionaux, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999
Quelles Conditions pour la reprise de la Coopération au
Burundi? Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999
Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-
operation, Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999
Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor in the
Burundi Peace Process, Africa Report N°19, 30 November 1999
L’Effet Mandela: Evaluation et Perspectives du Processus de
Paix Burundais, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000
The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the Peace
Process in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000
Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,
Political Prisoners and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,
22 June 2000
Burundi: Les Enjeux du Débat. Partis Politiques, Liberté de la
Presse et Prisonniers Politiques, Africa Report N°23, 12 July
2000
Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom of the
Press and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N° 23, 12 July 2000
Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, Africa
Briefing, 27 August 2000
Burundi: Ni guerre ni paix, Africa Report N° 25, 1 December
2000
Burundi: sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadre de
négociations, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001
Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New
Negotiating Framework, Africa Report N° 29, 14 May 2001
Burundi: Cent jours pour retrouver le chemin de la paix, Africa
Report N°33, 14 August 2001
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
How Kabila Lost His Way, DRC Report N°3, Africa Report
N°16, 21 May 1999
Africa’s Seven Nation War, DRC Report N°4, Africa Report
N°17, 21 May 1999
The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Africa Report N°18, 20 August 1999
Kinshasa sous Kabila, à la veille du dialogue national, Africa
Report N°19, 21 September 1999
Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, Africa
Report N° 26, 20 December 2000
From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,
Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001
Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,
Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001
RWANDA
Five Years after the Genocide: Justice in Question, Africa
Report N°11, 7 April 1999
Cinq Ans Après le Génocide au Rwanda: La Justice en
Question, Africa Report N°11, 7 April 1999
Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa Report
N°15, 4 May 2000
Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda: l’urgence de
juger, Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001
SIERRA LEONE
Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,
Africa Report N° 28, 11 April 2001
ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July 2000
Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,
25 September 2000
Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a way Forward, Africa Report
N°32, 13 July 2001
* Released since January 1999
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ASIA
BURMA/MYANMAR
Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?, Asia
Report N° 11, 21 December 2000
INDONESIA
Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia Report
N°9, 5 September 2000
Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000
Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, Asia
Report N° 10, 19 December 2000
Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross Human
Rights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001
Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20
February 2001
Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February
2001
Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, Asia
Report N° 15, 13 March 2001
Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, Indonesia
Briefing, 21 May 2001
Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, Asia
Report N° 17, 12 June 2001
Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? ICG Asia Report No
18, 27 June 2001
Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,
ICG Asia Report No 19, 27 June 2001
Indonesia-U.S. Military Ties: Asia Briefing, 18 July 2001
The Megawati Presidency, Indonesia Briefing, 10 September
2001
Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya: ICG Asia Report
N° 23, 20 September 2001
CAMBODIA
Back from the Brink, Asia Report N°4, 26 January 1999
Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11
August 2000
CENTRAL ASIA
Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia Report
N°7, 7 August 2000
Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,
Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000
Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report N°14,
1 March 2001
Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty and
Social Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001
Central Asia: Fault Lines in the Security Map, Asia Report N°
20, 4 July 2001
Central Asia: Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability,
Asia Report N°21, 21 August 2001
Kyrgystan at Ten: Trouble in the Island of Democracy, Asia
Report N°22, 28 August 2001
Central Asian Perspectives on 11 September and the Afghan
Crisis, Central Asia Briefing, 28 September 2001
BALKANS
ALBANIA
The State of Albania, Balkans Report N°54, 6 January 1999
Albania Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 11 May 1999
Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March
2000
Albania Briefing: Albania’s Local Elections, A test of Stability
and Democracy, 25 August 2000
Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans report Nº111,
25 May 2001
Albania Briefing: Albania’s Parliamentary Elections 2001, 23
August 2001
BOSNIA
Brcko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report N° 55, 8
February 1999
Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 56, 4 March 1999
Republika Srpska: Poplasen, Brcko and Kosovo – Three Crises
and Out? Balkans Report N°62, 6 April 1999
Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Balkans
Report N°64, 21 April 1999
Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damage
and Transformation,
Balkans Report N°71, 5 July 1999
Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of an
Independent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans
Report N°72, 5 July 1999
Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999
Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The
Anatomy of Hate and Fear, Balkans Report N°73, 2 August
1999
Is Dayton Failing? Policy Options and Perspectives Four Years
After, Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999
Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion and
Discrimination in a Post Communist Bureaucracy, Balkans
Report N°84, 15 December 1999
Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, Balkans
Report N°86, 23 February 2000
European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, Handbook
Overview, 14 April 2000
Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Balkans Report
N°90, 19 April 2000
Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,
Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000
Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International
Community Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000
War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans Report
N°103, 02 November 2000
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Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, Balkans Reort
N°104, 18 December 2000
Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate the
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 106, 15
March 2001
No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,
Balkans Report Nº110, 22 May 2001
Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open For Business;
Balkans Report N° 115, 7 August 2001
The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska:
Balkans Report N° 118, 8 October 2001
KOSOVO
Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward, Balkans
Report N°58, 12 March 1999
Kosovo: The Road to Peace, Balkans Report N°59, 12 March
1999
Kosovo Briefing: Atrocities in Kosovo Must be Stopped, 29
March 1999
Kosovo Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 2 April 1999
Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Balkans Report N°66, 17
May 1999
The New Kosovo Protectorate, Balkans report N°69, 20 June
1999
Kosovo Briefing: Who Will Lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?
28 June 1999
The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo, Balkans
Report N°74, 6 August 1999
Who’s Who in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°76, 31 August 1999
Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo, Balkans
Report N°79, 18 October 1999
Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Balkans Report
N°78, 2 November 1999
Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Balkans Report N°82,
26 November 1999
Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,
Balkans Report N°83, 10 December 1999
Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s Unfinished
Business, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000
What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report N°88, 3 March
2000
Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, Balkans
Report N°96, 31 May 2000
Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 27 June 2000
Elections in Kosovo: Moving toward Democracy? Balkans
Report N°97, 7 July 2000
Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000
Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing, 10
October 2000
Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001
MACEDONIA
Challenges and Choices for the New Government, Balkans
Report N°60, 29 March 1999
Toward Destabilisation? Balkans Report N°67, 21 May 1999
Macedonia Briefing: Government Holds Together, Eyes Fixed
on Upcoming Presidential Poll, 11 June 1999
Macedonia Briefing: Update of Recent Political Developments,
14 June 1999
Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections, Balkans
Report N°77, 18 October 1999
Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, Balkans
Report N°98, 2 August 2000
Macedonia government expects setback in local elections,
Briefing Paper, 4 September 2000
The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, Balkans
Report N°109, 5 April 2001
Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report N°
113, 20 June 2001
Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001
Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001
Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum, Balkans Briefing, 8
September 2001
MONTENEGRO
Montenegro Briefing: Milosevic to Move on Montenegro, 23
April 1999
Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm, 19 August 1999
Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans Report
N°89, 21 March 2000
Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?,
Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000
Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the National
Temperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000
Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, Briefing
Paper, 23 June 2000
Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30 November
2000
Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans Report
N°107, 28 March 2001
Montenegro: Time to Decide, Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001
Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, Balkans
Report N°114, 1 August 2001
SERBIA
Sidelining Slobodan: Getting Rid of Europe’s Last Dictator,
Balkans Report N°57, 15 March 1999
Milosevic’s Aims in War and Diplomacy, Balkans Report N°65,
11 May 1999
Yugoslavia Briefing: Wanted for War Crimes, 1 June 1999
Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,
Balkans Report N°70, 28 June 1999
Transforming Serbia: The Key to Long-Term Balkan Stability,
Balkans Report N°75, 10 August 1999
Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May
2000
Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop, Balkans
Report N°93, 5 June 2000
Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the September
Elections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000
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Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and
of Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19
September 2000
Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’s
Moment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Briefing, Balkans
Briefing, 10 October 2000
Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans Briefing,
20 December 2000
A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for regional Stability,
Balkans Report N° 112, 15 June 2001
Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution?, Balkans
Report N°116, 10 August 2001
Serbia’s Transition: Reforms Under Siege, Balkans Report
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